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ABSTRACT 
  Corporate insiders can avoid losses if they dispose of their stock 
while in possession of material nonpublic information. One means of 
disposal, selling the stock, is illegal and subject to prompt mandatory 
reporting. A second strategy is almost as effective, yet it faces lax 
reporting requirements and enforcement. That second method is to 
donate the stock to a charity and take a charitable tax deduction at the 
inflated stock price. This “insider giving” is a potent substitute for 
insider trading. We show that insider giving is far more widespread 
than previously believed. In particular, we show that insider giving is 
not limited to officers and directors. Large investors appear to regularly 
receive material nonpublic information and use it to avoid losses. Using 
a vast dataset of essentially all transactions in public company common 
stock since 1986, we find consistent and economically significant 
evidence that these shareholders’ impeccable timing likely reflects 
information leakage. We also document substantial evidence of 
backdating—investors falsifying the date of their gift to capture a larger 
tax break. We show why lax reporting and enforcement encourage 
insider giving, explain why insider giving represents a policy failure, 
and highlight the theoretical implications of these findings to broader 
corporate, securities, and tax debates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When corporate insiders learn about bad news at their company, 
they can avoid losses by selling their stock before the public finds out. 
This form of “insider trading” is illegal and risky. But selling stock is 
not the only way to cash out. A second strategy is almost as effective 
and faces lax reporting requirements and enforcement. That second 
method is to donate the stock to a charity and take a tax deduction at 
the inflated stock price. 
To understand the power of gifts, consider a recent gift by Kodak 
director George Karfunkel. On July 29, 2020, news that Kodak might 
land a lucrative government contract to manufacture COVID-19 
vaccines sent its stock soaring to $60 per share.1 Before the news, 
Kodak was worth only two dollars per share.2 Only a few days later, 
when the public learned that the deal was off, Kodak dropped to six 
dollars per share.3 In the narrow window in between, Karfunkel made 
 
 1.  Eastman Kodak Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.3 (Sept. 15, 2020) 
[hereinafter Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak 
Company], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000031235/000156459020043659/kodk-
ex993_7.htm [https://perma.cc/83KW-HA7B]. 
 2.  Eastman Kodak Company (KODK), YAHOO FINANCE!, https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
quote/KODK/history?p=KODK [https://perma.cc/PX4C-NPHV]. 
 3.  Rachael Levy, Geoffrey Rogow & Alex Leary, Kodak’s $765 Million Moment: How It 
Happened and How It Went Wrong, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/what-drove-kodaks-roller-coaster-trump-deal-one-determined-white-house-official-
11597935982 [https://perma.cc/TE9Q-6MC5]. 
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a donation of 3 million shares nominally worth $112 million.4 The 
impeccable timing of his philanthropy let him grab honorifics like “the 
single largest gift recorded to a religious group.”5 It also converted the 
gift into a money maker, conferring probable tax benefits worth more 
than $70 million on Karfunkel—nearly four times the proceeds of a 
legal sale of his shares.6 He cashed out at the peak of the wildly 
swinging stock price, and he nearly avoided regulatory attention.7  
Karfunkel’s gift bore important hallmarks of potential 
manipulation. As a director, Karfunkel likely knew that the 
government deal propping up the stock price was unlikely to 
materialize, and he might have used that information to time his gift. 
Further, it was later reported that Karfunkel retroactively rescinded 1 
million shares of his gift,8 adding to the oddity of the transaction. In 
such circumstances, suspicions may be raised regarding whether the 
 
 4.  Curt Devine, Kodak Insider’s Stock Donation Raises New Concerns Around the 
Company’s Government Loan, CNN (Aug. 11, 2020, 10:04 PM) [perma.cc/7X2W-ANU3]; see Al 
Root, Kodak Stock’s Rally Destroys Short Sellers. They’re Down $50 Million, BARRON’S (July 29, 
2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/kodak-stocks-rally-destroys-short-sellers-
theyre-down-50-million-51596056297 [https://perma.cc/8UZW-Q3KF]. Over 550 million shares 
changed hands on July 28 and 29. Root, supra. 
 5.  Theo Francis, Mark Maremont & Geoffrey Rogow, Kodak Insider Makes Well-Timed 
Stock Gift of $116 Million to Religious Charity He Started, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2020, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-insider-makes-well-timed-stock-gift-of-116-million-to-
religious-charity-he-started-11597154826 [https://perma.cc/99GW-JSU2]. 
 6.  Assuming the Kodak shareholder was at a 45 percent combined federal and state tax 
rate, writing off a $112 million donation brings a tax benefit of about $50.4 million. The gift would 
also eliminate the need to pay capital gains. If the stock was purchased at two dollars per share, 
the gains would be $106 million, and thus the capital gains tax avoided would be worth $21.2 
million. His 3 million shares would have been worth $6 million before the rumors of a government 
contract and $18 million after—a fraction of the tax benefit. 
 7.  Ironically, this suspicious donation contributed to concerns about unfair business 
practices at Kodak and jeopardized a large government loan to Kodak. In return, these troubling 
developments contributed to a precipitous drop in Kodak stock price, thereby severely hurting 
Kodak shareholders. Adam Shaw, SEC Investigating Kodak Announcement of $765 Million 
Government Loan: Report, FOX BUS. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/sec-
investigating-kodak-announcement-of-765-government-loan-report [https://perma.cc/U5A4-
Y5SX]. 
 8.  See Mark Maremont, Kodak Director Makes Retroactive Cut to Huge Charity Stock Gift, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2021, 3:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-director-makes-
retroactive-cut-to-huge-charity-stock-gift-11610571219 [https://perma.cc/2UUK-ZVHL] (explaining 
Karfunkel’s strange decision to rescind 1 million shares, without making the required filing for so 
doing). 
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reported date of the gift is accurate, or whether it may have been 
backdated to capture the higher predrop value.9  
Whatever the truth about Kodak, it is tempting to ignore 
manipulative gifting as uncommon, unimportant, and uninteresting: 
uncommon, because such gifts may appear to be aberrational; how 
often is a person simultaneously philanthropic and Machiavellian? 
Unimportant, because manipulative gifts are still gifts, and thus, 
harmless; tax, corporate, and securities law have much bigger fish to 
fry. Uninteresting, because everybody knows that directors sometimes 
abuse their power and insight.10 To the contrary, this Article 
demonstrates that manipulative gifts are worryingly widespread, toxic 
in the same ways as familiar forms of fraud and insider trading, and of 
great theoretical importance.  
Previous research indicates that corporate executives and 
directors use inside information as well as several manipulative 
techniques both to trade11 and to maximize the value of their gifts, 
 
 9.  Kodak commissioned an internal investigation to determine whether Karfunkel’s gifts 
constituted wrongdoing. Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Eastman 
Kodak Company, supra note 1, at 5. Unfortunately, the investigation was hamstrung in ways that 
limit its utility: 
Finally, it is important to note that Akin Gump’s ability to fully investigate the bona 
fides of the gift or the charity that received it was limited because we did not have access 
to the records of the charity and were unable to interview any of its officers or directors 
with the exception of Karfunkel. Akin Gump’s review and the Special Committee’s 
recommendations also do not address the potential tax implications of the gift to 
Karfunkel or any other party. 
Id. at 67. 
 10.  Interestingly, Karfunkel is not alone in the domain of photography-company fiduciaries 
allegedly involving charities in insider trading. Plaintiffs won a jury verdict arguing, inter alia, that 
Polaroid’s founder had caused a charitable foundation to sell large amounts of Polaroid stock 
while adverse information about the stock remained nonpublic (though the verdict was later 
overturned on other grounds). Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).  
 11.  For insider trading studies, see generally H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of 
Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986) (concluding that insiders can 
predict abnormal future stock price changes); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11 
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 267, 306–09 (2003) (examining insider trading laws and their enforcement); H. 
Nejat Seyhun, The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 1–22 (1988) 
(investigating the information content of aggregate insider trading); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Does 
Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1303, 1329 (1992) 
(documenting “a strong relation between past aggregate insider trading and future excess stock 
returns”); H. NEJAT SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE FROM INSIDER TRADING (1998) 
(explaining that insider trading signals provide valuable investment advice); Bin Ke, Steven 
Huddart & Kathy Petroni, What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It: 
Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 315 (2003) (documenting insider trading 
on “knowledge of specific and economically significant forthcoming accounting disclosures as 
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often just prior to a decline in the company’s share price.12 That 
research uncovered a floor, not a ceiling, on the amount of 
manipulative giving, because it was focused exclusively on executives 
and directors. No previous research investigates whether large 
shareholders are able to utilize insider information when making a 
donation of the stock of their company. Yet if executives can use 
corporate information to inflate the value of their gifts, then they can 
share such with large shareholders whose favor executives may seek. 
Moreover, some manipulative giving is accomplished through 
backdating gifts. After a stock price drops, the donor softens the blow 
by falsely recording a gift made at the earlier time, claiming a deduction 
based on the earlier (higher) price. Any large investor with an eraser 
can give backdating a try yet, until now, no one had any guess as to 
whether shareholders were in on the game. 
This Article investigates manipulative gifts by utilizing a 
comprehensive database that includes all gifts of common stock by 
large shareholders in all publicly listed firms in the United States. Our 
data cover all reported gifts of common stock and contain over 9,000 
observations between 1986 and 2020.13 The total volume of gifts 
contained in our dataset is approximately 2.1 billion shares, with a 
dollar value of approximately $50 billion. Consequently, our findings 
apply generally to all large shareholders’ gifts of their firm’s stock.  
We find that large shareholders’ gifts are suspiciously well-timed. 
Stock prices rise abnormally about 6 percent during the one-year 
period before the gift date, and they fall abnormally by about 4 percent 
during the one-year period after the gift date, meaning that large 
shareholders tend to find the perfect day on which to give.  
 
long as 2 years prior to the disclosure”); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Scott A. Richardson & 
Rodrigo S. Verdi, Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider 
Trading?, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 49, 68 (2006) (concluding that “managers’ repurchase and insider 
trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying the operating accruals 
trading strategy”). 
 12.  See David Yermack, Deductio’ Ad Absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to 
Their Own Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 107–08 (2009) (discussing and studying large 
gifts of stock by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies to their own private family 
foundations); see also S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Manipulative Games 
of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1131, 1170 (2016) (observing that sometimes 
executives will donate stocks just prior to a negative announcement that they know will drop stock 
prices).  
 13.  We exclude preferred stock from our study because its value is less sensitive to 
information. Yet some manipulative giving may involve preferred stock, so our results may 
understate the extent of manipulative giving. 
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These results are almost certainly not the result of luck. To the 
contrary, our research lets us identify information leakage as the most 
important cause of these results: executives seem to provide material 
nonpublic information to large shareholders, who then use it to time 
gifts. A second explanation is also supported, though its magnitude is 
smaller: backdating. The telltale sign of backdating is that the givers’ 
extraordinary luck tends to grow alongside the delay they take in 
reporting the gift. A donor who waits a few weeks to report a gift can 
cherry-pick the best date to retroactively claim their gift was 
consummated. That is precisely what we find.14  
The evidence is consistent with insider giving being quite common: 
there are enough suspicious gifts for every public company to be 
subject to it every year.15 It is also large in magnitude. This Article 
focuses on the large shareholder. When the gifts of officers and 
directors are added to the sample, we see over $300 billion of gifts and 
suspicious outperformance, suggesting the possibility of approximately 
$10 billion in excess tax deductions annually.16 
The widespread occurrence of manipulative gifts is surely a result 
of a lax regulatory environment. It is commonly believed that “there’s 
no law against insider giving.”17 That belief is erroneous. Numerous 
state and federal laws constrain manipulative gifts.18 However, there is 
no doubt that the law of insider giving is less clear and developed than 
the law of insider trading. Gifts also enjoy an attractive degree of 
opacity—whereas insider sales must be reported within two days, 
insider gifts can be reported more than 400 days after the fact.19 Finally, 
the tax code that awards deductions for gifts appears to be entirely 
naive to the possibility of manipulative giving; from a tax perspective, 
manipulative givers have nothing to fear.20 
 
 14.  Infra Part III.D. 
 15.  This Article addresses almost 10,000 shareholder gifts, across more than 1,600 firms over 
34 years—a rate of about 14 percent per firm-year. Infra Part III.B. Previous research on 
executive gifts identified more than 200,000 gifts across almost 10,000 firms over 29 years, Avci et 
al., supra note 12, at 1152, suggesting a rate of about 79 percent per firm-year. Together, 
shareholder and executive gifts exceed one per year.  
 16.  This figure combines both large shareholders at the heart of this study, as well as officers 
and directors. 
 17.  Francis et al., supra note 5. 
 18.  Infra Part III.  
 19.  Infra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
 20.  Infra Part I.B. 
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But is it so bad? The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) has long believed that an insider’s gifts “present less 
likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”21 And it may seem intuitive 
that manipulative gifts are ultimately harmless—the recipient charity 
is still better off than it started. Yet manipulative gifts undermine the 
policy goals of several different bodies of law. As a matter of tax policy, 
deductions are available for charitable giving to encourage generous 
philanthropy, but here society has gotten a bad deal—granting a large 
tax deduction for a trivial gift.  
As a matter of corporate and securities law, manipulative gifts 
involve a powerful insider misusing her connections to the corporation 
to personally profit—even though the ultimate result likely hurts the 
corporation and its other shareholders.22 Insider trading makes the 
market a more dangerous place for noninsiders.23 Because charities 
resell the gifts they receive, insider giving leads to the same dangers as 
insider trading, but one step removed. The effect is substantially the 
same as if the insider had simply engaged in illegal insider trading—
selling securities despite knowing their imminent collapse—and 
donating the proceeds. The U.S. Supreme Court said as much in one of 
its most significant insider trading opinions—“The tip and trade 
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits 
to the recipient”—without quite realizing that this association cast 
aspersion on manipulative gifts.24  
That manipulative giving is widespread and pernicious should be 
of great interest to scholars and policymakers. One reason is that it 
cries out for a solution. For example, the law is currently structured on 
the premise that gifts present few opportunities for abuse.25 The data 
show the opposite: gifts appear to be abused far more often than sales, 
at least when large shareholders are concerned.26 The assumption of 
 
 21.  Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-26333 & 35-24768, 42 SEC Docket 464, 492 (Dec. 2, 1988).  
 22.  Recall that suspicious transactions, like the large gift, helped spoil Kodak’s shot at the 
government contract. Shaw, supra note 7. 
 23.  Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading and 
Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 855 (2018).  
 24.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 25.  Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, supra 
note 21. 
 26.  See infra Part III (showing that large shareholder sales do not display hallmarks of 
manipulation).  
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harmlessness must be questioned, and the lax regulatory environment 
permitting this must be fixed. 
But even apart from a direct solution, insider giving is grounds for 
reflection. A longstanding debate in law and finance considers the good 
and bad of having powerful shareholders: they reduce managerial 
agency costs but extract private benefits.27 That literature focuses on 
controlling shareholders,28 but the vast majority of the shareholders in 
our set are not controllers. These findings shed light on a previously 
unnoticed channel for private benefit extraction and suggest that 
extraction occurs at far lower levels of ownership than previously 
surmised.  
Two other debates in contemporary corporate law concern the 
role of constituency directors, who represent a single investor group,29 
and the valence of hedge fund activism.30 Many scholars expect a 
director nominated by a single investor to help that specific investor.31 
This Article adds more grist for consideration: it appears that large 
shareholders find ways to extract information from the directors and 
executives beholden to them in order to deploy it for their own benefit. 
That insider giving by shareholders was observable but 
unobserved provides one more reason to attend to it. Manipulative 
gifts currently face low risk of enforcement or prosecution, so insiders 
likely feel safer utilizing material nonpublic information in that 
 
 27.  E.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 505 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003). 
28 See supra note 27. 
 29.  E.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a 
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 763 
(2008) (suggesting “that the standards of liability for breach of fiduciary duty should not change 
in order to account for new or increasingly common circumstances implicating fiduciary duties”); 
Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 309, 312 (2013) (discussing the rise of constituency directors and analyzing their role in 
the corporate environment). 
 30.  Compare K.J. Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, 
Hedge Fund Activists: Value Creators or Good Stock Pickers? 1 (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614029 [https://perma.cc/JJE8-4E2D] (arguing that 
activist hedge funds do not create value), with Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The 
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (defending 
activist hedge funds). 
 31.  Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (2017) (“Corporate law has long relied on oversight 
by independent directors—directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than 
their service on the board—over corporate decisions where the interests of the controller 
substantially diverge from those of the company or its public investors . . . .”).  
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domain. Unhidden insider giving is a hint at what shareholders know—
and what they may be doing outside of plain sight. 
To address these issues, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
offers a general discussion of giving—why people do it and how they 
can use manipulative strategies to increase the value of their gifts to a 
surprising degree. Part II explains why manipulative gifts, even when 
illegal, pose rather little legal risk for insiders. Part III contains this 
Article’s empirical findings. Part IV discusses tax and insider trading 
policy to connect the dots on why manipulative giving is bad. Part V 
offers proposals for reform followed by concluding remarks and 
reflections on the implications of these findings for other debates.  
I. TAKING STOCK OF STOCK GIFTS 
Insider giving is about opportunism posing as, or at least muddled 
with, ordinary philanthropy. This Part introduces the basic concepts 
underlying charitable gifts, manipulative and otherwise. Section A 
describes the principal ethical, psychological, and economic 
motivations for gifts. Section B introduces reasons why a donor might 
prefer to donate stock, rather than liquidating such stock and donating 
the proceeds. One of those reasons is the differential legal treatment 
of gifts and sales. As Section C explains, donating stock carries some 
of the benefits of selling and may be appealing when it is impractical or 
illegal to sell. Donors can use at least five different tactics to profit from 
gifts, sidestepping constraints that would bar a similar sale. Section D 
presents a taxonomy of these manipulative giving techniques.  
A. Why People Give  
Broadly speaking, people make philanthropic gifts for a 
combination of three reasons: intrinsic, image, and extrinsic 
motivation. Intrinsic motivation represents the subjective value of 
donating for the sake of the recipient, which is shaped by the 
individual’s altruism and other private preferences.32 Image motivation 
represents the individual’s desire to be positively perceived by others.33 
 
 32.  Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image 
Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544 (2009). 
 33.  Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
1652, 1653–54 (2006); see also Zachary Grossman, Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in 
Giving 1–2 (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7320x2cp 
[https://perma.cc/J8R6-JFAV] (describing how social signaling, actions taken to influence others’ 
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Charities help allocate image in a variety of ways such as publishing 
lists of donors34 or rewarding donors with a branded amenity, such as a 
mug, tote bag,35 or coveted board seat.36 Extrinsic benefits include 
rewards such as wealth and privileges. For example, it is commonly 
understood that “donations” to educational institutions may incline 
them to admit the donor’s child.37 The most salient extrinsic benefit 
from giving comes from the Internal Revenue Code, which allows 
individuals to reduce their taxable income by an amount approximately 
equal to what they give to tax-exempt charities.38 
The tax benefits from a gift are usually substantially less than the 
value of the gift, so a person is rarely richer for having given. However, 
individuals who value altruism or obtain reputation benefits from the 
gift may find that the tax break sweetens the deal enough to make a 
gift. For example, an individual who enjoys $800 worth of satisfaction 
from altruism and reputation benefits from a $1,000 gift will not find 
those benefits compelling; better to spend the $1,000 selfishly.39 But if 
the individual can make a $1,000 gift (capturing the $800 in altruism 
and consumption) and still retain $200 or more through tax reductions, 
then the gift transaction looks like a good idea. A tax incentive 
 
perceptions of oneself, and self-signaling, “efforts to maintain positive beliefs about oneself,” 
underscore image motivation in the context of giving). 
 34.  E.g., Annual Giving Leadership Society Honor Roll of Donors, HARVEY MUDD COLL., 
https://www.hmc.edu/campaign/how-to-give/annual-mudd-fundd/annual-giving-leadership-
society/annual-giving-leadership-society-honor-roll-of-donors [https://perma.cc/CLG4-FS4L]. 
 35.  Adrienne Lafrance, How NPR Tote Bags Became a Thing, ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-npr-tote-bags-became-a-thing/390657 
[https://perma.cc/Z3Q5-EU7Q]. 
 36.  Eve Proper, Give or Get Off: The Role of Trustees in College Fundraising, 
PHILANTHROPY & EDUC., Fall 2019, at 1, 1; Robin Pogrebin, Trustees Find Board Seats Are Still 
Luxury Items, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/arts/03center.html 
[https://perma.cc/XQL9-U8A3]. 
 37.  Louise Radnofsky, Many Colleges That Got Money Tainted by Admissions Scandal Still 
Have It, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-colleges-that-
got-money-tainted-by-admissions-scandal-still-have-it-11569510323 [https://perma.cc/N8ER-Q2WV].  
 38.  The charitable contribution deduction is covered by 26 U.S.C. § 170, which falls within 
Part VI of Subchapter B of the Internal Revenue Code called “Itemized Deductions for 
Individuals and Corporations.” The Code has allowed individuals and corporations to deduct 
charitable contributions from their taxable income since 1917 and 1935, respectively. What Is the 
Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions?, TAX POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-tax-treatment-charitable-contributions 
[https://perma.cc/52G5-2VWC].  
 39.  Here, we help ourselves to the convention of presenting degrees of satisfaction in dollar-
value terms. We do not intend to make contentious psychological claims, such as that individuals 
actually reason using money as the baseline, particularly when altruism is a chief motivation. 
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provides that extra nudge. At a 28 percent marginal tax rate, a $1,000 
gift would save the donor $280 on taxes, making the charitable path a 
great choice.  
Although tax deductions are meant to offset the financial cost of 
a gift only partially, a donor may enrich herself by donating if she 
improperly overstates the value of the gift. For example, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office found that half of automobile donors 
overstate the value of their gift by a factor of 10.40 If a $1,000 deduction 
is improperly taken for a $100 car, a giver subject to a 28 percent tax 
rate would be enriched by $280 worth of avoided taxes.41 Such a giver 
is richer than if she had sold the car for its fair market value of $100. 
Tax law does not endeavor to enrich donors by more than they 
donate,42 but it certainly can in unusual cases. And those unusual cases 
are far more likely when property is given rather than cash, as the next 
Section discusses.  
B. What People Give 
Although cash may seem like the most natural gift, charities will 
often accept gifts of property, such as stock. If the charity would rather 
have cash, it can then sell the gifted property. Of course, donors 
inclined to dispose of stock could themselves sell the stock and then 
donate the proceeds to the charity, but they will often find a direct gift 
of stock more advantageous. Donations of securities are exempt from 
capital gains taxes on any appreciation in value upon any sale.43 This 
exemption from capital gains taxation amounts to a second tax benefit, 
on top of the deduction available for charitable gifts. For example, a 
security purchased for $100 and sold for $1,000 would represent a $900 
capital gain. With a long-term capital gains rate of 20 percent, the seller 
would net only $820 from the transaction. Giving up $1,000 to send 
 
 40.  Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Hon. Mark Everson, 
Comm’r, IRS, Washington, D.C.).  
 41.  28 percent is the alternative minimum tax, a federal income tax that acts as the marginal 
rate for many high-income individuals. In fact, the savings may be higher or lower. Someone 
subject to state income tax would see a reduction in that tax as well. And appreciated assets are 
usually deducted without any tax on the unrealized appreciation.  
 42.  Infra Part.IV.A. 
 43.  E.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 214 (14th ed. 2018). 
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$820 to a charity is obviously worse than sending $1,000, regardless of 
why one gives.  
Two other reasons encourage gifts of property. First, the fair 
market value of property may be debatable, permitting donors to 
improperly misstate the value of their deductible gifts.44 Accordingly, 
Treasury Regulations show meaningful skepticism regarding the 
valuation of property gifts in general,45 and stock in particular.46 
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, Treasury Regulations 
impose no special appraisal burden on the valuation of marketable 
securities, for which a stock exchange provides active trading prices. 
The stock’s fair market value is simply that day’s trading price.47 There 
is no flexibility for the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or taxpayer 
to argue for a different valuation, on the theory that there is no serious 
risk of overvaluation in this context. 
There is a second reason donors sometimes prefer gifts of stock, 
having nothing to do with debatable valuation: selling the stock 
(whether to fund a donation or consumption) may be illegal or risky. It 
is to that second reason we now turn. 
C. Giving as a Substitute for Selling 
The second reason why a donor may prefer to give property rather 
than sell it (perhaps donating the proceeds) is that selling may be 
 
 44.  Suppose that the fair value of some private shares is $0.001, but they are valued at 
$0.0000001 for tax purposes. Making a $2,000 IRA contribution at this low value per share can 
inflate subsequent tax benefits by 10,000-fold when shares publicly trade later at fair market value 
and create $100 million IRA accounts. See S. Burcu Avci, M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, 
How Should Retirement Plans Be Organized, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 337, 382 (2017); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-16, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: IRS 
COULD BOLSTER ENFORCEMENT ON MULTIMILLION DOLLAR ACCOUNTS, BUT MORE 
DIRECTION FROM CONGRESS IS NEEDED 41 (2014) (demonstrating the advantage of investing in 
assets valued very low with high returns if successful). 
 45.  See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(11)(B); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(b)(3)(i) (2020).  
 46.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(b)(3)(i) (2020). Deductions for the charitable contribution of 
stock are generally measured based on the fair market value of the stock at the time of 
contribution. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2020). If there were no stock exchange sales on the 
contribution date, taxpayers can rely on the selling prices within a reasonable period before and 
after the contribution date. Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2020). More specifically, fair market value is 
calculated based on the average of the highest and lowest selling prices on the nearest possible 
dates with sales before and after the contribution date. Id. The taxpayer then takes the weighted 
average of these two daily averages, based on the number of trading days from the contribution 
date. Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(2) (2020). 
 47.  Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2020). More precisely, the value is generally the midpoint of the 
highest and lowest prices at which the security traded on the day of the gift. Id.  
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illegal, attract adverse media attention, or both. Insider trading is 
plainly illegal.48 A gift of $1,000 that captures $460 in tax benefits may 
be preferable to a sale for $1,000 and an adverse mention in the Wall 
Street Journal or a prison sentence.  
These latter reasons (overvaluation and legal restrictions) could 
work in concert. Imagine a shareholder who knew for certain that a 
$1,000 stock’s fair market value was really 32.5 percent of its current 
market price; tomorrow morning, the facts undergirding this 
skepticism will be made public, and the price will surely fall. Such an 
investor has three options. First, she could wait until the stock falls to 
$325, accepting a $675 loss. Then, when she sells the depreciated stock, 
she will still owe taxes, netting her $280 post-tax.49 Second, she could 
sell her $1,000 stake today, netting $820.50 But in doing so, she may 
violate numerous civil and criminal prohibitions. Even if she beats 
those charges, the embarrassment and stress of facing them serves as a 
potent deterrent. 
Here is a third option: give a gift of stock to a charity, claiming a 
$1,000 deduction and avoiding capital gains taxes. Amazingly, the 
shareholder would then net the same amount by giving the gift as by 
selling the stock—$280 in tax-adjusted profits cash in hand. That is 
because her taxes would be reduced by 28 percent of the $1,000 value 
claimed. She would also likely avoid legal and reputational risk, all with 
the satisfaction of supporting a charity that has feted her. Indeed, if the 
share price were slated to fall to below $325, she would be strictly better 
off by donating than by waiting to sell.51 Her tax savings from the gift 
would exceed the postdrop sale proceeds. When price drops are likely 
to be large, donating stock strictly dominates patient sales, even for 
taxpayers with no intrinsic or reputational interest in charity. 
Whether as a substitute for illegal selling (making a smaller profit 
with less legal and reputation risk) or legal, patient selling (making 
large tax-adjusted benefit with greater intrinsic and reputational 
 
 48.  Infra Part II. 
 49.  We assume for each example a 20 percent capital gains rate on stock originally obtained 
for $100. Thus, the sale will realize $225 in capital gains and, thus, a $45 capital gains tax. 
 50.  Here, again, we assume 28 percent income tax and 20 percent capital gains imposed on 
stock that has appreciated ten times since purchase. 
 51.  Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1159 (2008) 
(emphasizing that, as a result of valuation abuse, “[m]any taxpayers, in effect, are provided with 
the equivalent of a deduction equal to much more than 100 cents for each dollar of property value 
given to charity” (quoting George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 
1449, 1450 (2005))). 
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gains), it is plain that stock gifts can sometimes substitute for other 
forms of disposition. The next Section explains the mechanics and 
conditions associated with gifts at their most attractive, for investors 
who are not content with mere luck.  
D. A Taxonomy of Manipulative Giving 
When it comes to gifts of stock, it is better to be lucky than good. 
But where there is neither luck nor goodness, there is manipulation. 
This Section describes three manipulative strategies donors can use to 
unlock surprising tax benefits from their gifts: using material nonpublic 
information to time a gift; leaning on management to delay (or 
accelerate) disclosures; or fraudulently pretending that a transaction 
took place on a different day than it did. We call these strategies 
information, influence, and backdating, respectively. The former two 
are access strategies that presume insiders have a cordial relationship 
with corporate management. The latter requires no access to 
management—the fraud is based on falsely reporting the date of the 
transaction. 
To understand these three strategies, consider a gift that attracted 
ample attention some years ago—George Soros’s donation of $192 
million worth of JetBlue stock. The basic facts of the case are simple 
and uncontested. For the purposes of this illustration, several small 
additions (which are clearly identified) are imagined to highlight 
several manipulative possibilities. These three strategies are not 
mutually exclusive, as discussed in the final Section.52  
 
 52.  Nor are shareholder gift transactions the only possible strategy; insiders also sold stock 
during this period. See JetBlue Airways Corp., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership 
(Form 4) (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1158463/000090020303000019/xslF345X03/edgar.xml [https://perma.cc/675D-V2KF] 
(filing for George Soros). There was also a stark increase in insider reports beginning in late 
November and continuing into early December. An Edgar search reveals 54 Form 4s filed for 
JetBlue from October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2003—the vast majority of which were sales. 
See Search Results for JetBlue Airways Corp., EDGAR, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/?r=el# 
[https://perma.cc/DP2W-ZFPY] (select “custom” date range and narrow file dates from October 
1, 2003 to December 31, 2003, then refine search results by form type 4). Of those insider reports, 
17 were filed for October, 18 for November, and 19 for December. Id. Also, there were seven gifts 
by JetBlue insiders filed in February 2004 reporting for December 31, 2003. See Search Results 
for JetBlue Airways Corp., EDGAR, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/?r=el# [https://perma.cc/ 
T3G2-SXSB] (select “custom” date range and narrow file dates from December 1, 2003 to June 
1, 2004, then refine search results by form type 5). 
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1. The Facts.  George Soros rose to fame and wealth betting on 
currency in the 1990s,53 but he also served as one of JetBlue’s earliest 
investors.54 Two of Soros’s close associates served as directors of 
JetBlue beginning in 1998.55 On November 3, 2003, Soros filed a Form 
4 documenting a large gift of 2.9 million shares.56 It listed the gift date 
as October 9, 2003.57 On that date, JetBlue shares were trading at an 
average price of $66.50, valuing the gift at $192 million.58 Soros 
obtained those shares for about five dollars.59 Thus, he would have 
realized $61.50 per share in profit had he instead sold on that day. By 
instead giving shares, Soros plausibly obtained tax benefits of $30.92 
 
 53.  Steve Schaefer, Forbes Flashback: How George Soros Broke the British Pound and Why 
Hedge Funds Probably Can’t Crack the Euro, FORBES (July 7, 2015, 11:40 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/07/07/forbes-flashback-george-soros-british-
pound-euro-ecb/?sh=459f24206131 [https://perma.cc/J45P-SLQL]. 
 54.  Jet Blue Skies, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2001, 12:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2001/01/ 
31/0131jetblue.html?sh=35b0e46d12fa [https://perma.cc/YX5G-WASJ]; Soros and JetBlue 
Founder Sell Some Holdings, REUTERS (June 4, 2007, 3:47 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/jetblue-soros/soros-and-jetblue-founder-sell-some-holdings-idUSN0420189920070604 
[https://perma.cc/PM9X-KUMX]; Soros To Help Fund New Low-Cost Airline, L.A. TIMES (July 
14, 1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jul-14-fi-55803-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/P3TP-AYFP]. 
 55.  One had served as a managing partner and later a senior advisor for Soros Fund 
Management LLC, and he also served as a managing director for Soros Private Funds 
Management LLC from 2001 to 2003. JetBlue Airways Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7 
(Apr. 18, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001158463/000104746905010540/ 
a2155413zdef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/CQ6F-2VMP]. The other served as a cohead of the Soros 
Private Equity division of Soros Fund Management LLC since 1998. Id. at 8. 
 56.  Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4, supra note 52.  
 57.  Id. Soros also filed a number of Form 4s to report sales of JetBlue stock in December 
2004. None reported any gifts. See, e.g., JetBlue Airways Corp., Statement of Changes in 
Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Dec. 12, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
0000900203/000090020304000026/xslF345X03/edgar.xml [https://perma.cc/NPS6-D2GX] (filing 
for George Soros). 
 58.  The story is simplified in two trivial ways. First, the stock was actually trading higher 
than $66.50—it closed at $70.26. JetBlue Airways - Stock Split History | JBLU, MACROTRENDS, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/JBLU/jetblue-airways/stock-splits [https://perma.cc/554B-
CT8V]. However, IRS rules required Soros to take the midpoint of opening and closing price. 
Second, the arithmetic that follows takes place over a period of time in which stock splits took 
place. There were two 3:2 stock splits. Historical Prices, JETBLUE, http:// 
blueir.investproductions.com/investor-relations/stock-information/historical-prices [https://perma.cc/ 
4WK2-AQB6]. All the subsequent figures use split-adjusted prices. The method used to obtain 
the dollar values in this section is to multiply the historical stock price reported by JetBlue by 1.5 
for each of two stock splits where appropriate. 
 59.  Beth Piskora, JetBlue Takes Off IPO Skyrockets 67%; Soros Makes A Mint, N.Y. POST 
(Apr. 13, 2002, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2002/04/13/jetblue-takes-off-ipo-skyrockets-67-
soros-makes-a-mint [https://perma.cc/QUR7-HZG2] (stating that Soros’s average cost per share 
was five dollars). 
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per share or about $90 million.60 He was able to support a charity he 
cares about61 and garner the superlative praise as Forbes Magazine’s 
“most generous giver.”62  
The gift attracted attention because it was especially well timed. 
JetBlue stock prices spiked on precisely October 9, never before or 
since climbing to such heights.63 The next sections proceed to unpack 
more events—some real, some supposed—that serve as case studies in 
manipulative giving. 
2. Using Information to Time Gifts.  JetBlue was doing well early 
in 2003. It entered Atlanta in May 200364 and announced in September 
2003 its plans to begin service at Boston’s Logan Airport.65 But there 
were also signs of trouble. JetBlue had violated its own privacy policy 
by transferring its passenger data to a private defense contractor.66 
Class action lawsuits were filed on September 22.67  
Now imagine the following hypothetical. Say a major shareholder, 
let’s call him Smith, decided around September 22, when the stock 
price was $57.96, that it was time to sell his shares or make a substantial 
gift. Making a gift would yield tax savings of $26.82 per share, for a total 
 
 60.  He would have owed 20 percent of $61.50 appreciation. That $12.30 capital gains tax is 
avoided through giving. And then he can deduct $66.50 per share, which reduces the amount of 
income subject to a 28 percent marginal rate, for an additional $18.62 in tax savings. 
 61.  The shares went to the Open Society Institute, the charitable trust Mr. Soros uses for 
most of his giving. Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4, supra note 52.  
 62.  Jennifer Wang, The New Forbes Philanthropy Score: How We Ranked Each Forbes 400 
Billionaire Based on Their Giving, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jenniferwang/2020/09/08/the-new-forbes-philanthropy-score-how-we-ranked-each-forbes-
400-billionaire-based-on-their-giving/?sh=1492b7929eba [https://perma.cc/2FQW-3N2E].  
 63.  MACROTRENDS, supra note 58.  
 64.  Kelly Yamanouchi, How JetBlue Is Expanding in Atlanta, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 6, 
2017), https://www.ajc.com/blog/airport/how-jetblue-expanding-atlanta/F8GTbw7Swze0EKmTr8YNAP 
[https://perma.cc/N9YL-YAH6]. 
 65.  JetBlue Airways Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-K) 19 (Oct. 27, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001158463/000104746903034461/a2120967z10-q.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5Z6T-Z9HC]. 
 66.  Ryan Singel, Army Quietly Opens JetBlue Probe, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2003, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2003/11/army-quietly-opens-jetblue-probe [https://perma.cc/L6WV-FKU9].  
 67.  Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Retains Deloitte & Touche To Assist the Airline in Its 
Analysis of Its Privacy Policy; Airline Confirms It Will Not Be a Test Airline for CAPPS II (Sept. 
22, 2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2003/09-22-2003-
015145604 [https://perma.cc/YY7V-J5QV]; Bloomberg News, Company News; JetBlue Sued Over 
Release of Passenger Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/24/ 
business/company-news-jetblue-sued-over-release-of-passenger-data.html [https://perma.cc/3UGP-
HQ7D]. 
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of $78 million.68 One can likewise imagine Smith discussing the plans 
with JetBlue directors. Those directors could mention that JetBlue 
plans to announce a stock split by October 7, with a positive 
management assessment of its bright future growth prospects.69 They 
may also have heard early rumors that JetBlue would be named 
America’s best airline by Conde Nast on October 10.70 They might have 
urged Smith to delay his gift a few weeks. As things turned out, waiting 
three weeks would increase the value of his tax savings by 15 percent 
or $12 million.71  
The previous scenario envisioned Smith delaying a planned gift to 
capture the eventual disclosure of management-manufactured good 
news. We call such delay a waiting game strategy. There are 
possibilities in the opposite direction, too, such as moving a gift forward 
to beat out trouble, which we denote as gun-jumping.  
Suppose that Smith met on October 9 with his friends on the 
JetBlue board to congratulate them on the bumper quarter and to let 
them know about his plans to make a large gift of stock in a few weeks. 
Those directors would have likely known that JetBlue was in for a 
bumpy ride until the end of the year: in two weeks, JPMorgan would 
downgrade JetBlue’s stock, noting reduced opportunity at John F. 
Kennedy Airport and increased competition from Delta.72 Beginning 
on October 23, reports would leak that JetBlue was scheduled to end 
the much-vaunted Atlanta service on December 4 in response to 
increased competition.73 Presumably, that decision was already in the 
 
 68.  The sale gains are $57.96 − $5. The tax benefits are $52.96 × 0.2 ($10.59) in avoided 
capital gains and $57.96 × 0.28 ($16.23) in income tax deductions. 
 69.  The 10-Q stated that the board declared the split on October 6. JetBlue Airways Corp., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 22 (Oct. 27, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
0001158463/000104746903034461/a2120967z10-q.htm. [https://perma.cc/X38F-RDCV]. 
 70.  Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Named Best U.S. Airline by Conde Nast Traveler 
Readers; Low-Fare Carrier Tops Readers’ Choice Awards 2nd Year Running and Ranks as One 
of World’s Top Three Airlines (Oct. 10, 2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-
relations/press-releases/2003/10-10-2003-015144948 [https://perma.cc/5DUV-2JCQ]. 
 71.  At that point, the shares were worth $66.50 per share, yielding tax savings of $30.92. 
Supra note 60. $30.92 is 15 percent higher than $26.82. The total tax savings of $90 million is $12 
million more than $78 million.  
 72.  J.P. Morgan Lowers JetBlue Airways to ‘Underweight,’ BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2003, 
12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2003-10-23/j-dot-p-dot-morgan-lowers-
jetblue-airways-to-underweight [https://perma.cc/8AWV-GFVD]; Deshundra Jefferson, JetBlue 
Tumbles on Downgrade, CNN MONEY (Oct. 24, 2003, 6:15 PM), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2003/10/24/news/companies/jetblue/index.htm [https://perma.cc/QN65-DNEA]. 
 73.  J.P. Morgan Lowers JetBlue Airways to ‘Underweight’, supra note 72; Jefferson, supra 
note 72.  
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works on October 9. If friends urged Smith to give his shares early, on 
October 9, he could deduct $66.50 per share, rather than the 
postdisclosure prices in the $54–56 range. As with delaying his gift 
(waiting game), accelerating his gift (gun-jumping) could have netted 
Smith more than $10 million in additional tax benefits.  
3. Using Influence To Time Corporate Disclosures.  In the previous 
scenarios, Smith’s choice of gift date was flexible, but the board’s 
decision to make announcements was taken for granted. But it could 
be the other way around, with Smith intent upon an October 9 gift 
(perhaps to meet a prior pledged commitment), and the board having 
some freedom about when news is disclosed. Instead of Smith 
contacting friends to fish for information about when to give, he could 
call to let them know his preferences with the understanding that they 
would bring JetBlue into accord wherever possible. We can call it bullet 
dodging if executives delay bad news to suit a donor’s plans and spring 
loading if they accelerate good news. 
For example, the board announced a three-for-two stock split 
(with a favorable growth outlook from the management) on October 7 
to the market’s general acclaim.74 But perhaps that announcement was 
initially planned for October 14. Perhaps it was accelerated by a week 
to help Smith’s gift transaction. Conversely, JetBlue’s termination of 
Atlanta service could have been planned for disclosure early in 
October—say, two months before the closure would actually occur—
but the board might have delayed the negative announcement by a few 
weeks, increasing the number of customers whose post-December 
tickets would have been canceled but improving Smith’s gift prospects.  
Speaking generally, delaying disappointing disclosures until after 
gifts are made will inflate their value just as much as accelerating gifts 
to precede the disappointing disclosure. Likewise, accelerating positive 
disclosures improves the value of subsequent gifts by the same amount 
as delayed gifts would. Powerful shareholders may have access to 
information they can use to time their gifts and enough influence to 
alter the timing of disclosures.  
These four strategies—waiting game, gun-jumping, bullet 
dodging, and spring loading—are all forms of access strategies, which 
 
 74.  Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Airways Announces Three-for-Two Stock Split (Oct. 7, 
2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2003/10-07-2003-015145276 
[https://perma.cc/6AG4-UZR4] (“The three-for-two stock split reflects our confidence in the 
Company’s future growth prospects . . . .”). 
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depend on a close relationship between shareholders and 
management. Table 1 summarizes the four options already described, 
before proceeding with a rather different method of manipulating gift 
values. 
Table 1: Access Strategies 











4. Backdating.  Suppose now that JetBlue’s board neither spirited 
information to Smith nor adjusted corporate policy to suit his giving 
plans. Instead, Smith merely noticed on November 3 that his JetBlue 
stock had been through a rough patch because of the downgrade and 
the loss of Atlanta. As a result, JetBlue was trading at $54.26, down 
more than $10 from just a few weeks prior, so that Smith’s shares were 
worth about $157 million. 
In this scenario, Smith could sell his shares that day and obtain 
about $129 million to keep or give away. A second option would be to 
donate it to his foundation today and obtain tax benefits worth $72 
million.75 A third option involves backdating. He could decide 
retroactively that his gift had occurred three weeks prior on October 9, 
when the stock was worth $192 million. To do this, he would record the 
gift as made on October 9 on the Form 4, which he will file with the 
SEC on November 3. By penciling in the wrong date for the gift, Smith 
could still give $157 million to the foundation he supports but claim tax 
benefits worth $90 million, an increase of almost 50 percent or $18 
million. 
Backdating is qualitatively different from the previous 
manipulative giving strategies. It does not depend on access to 
management for the strategic timing of disclosures or donations. This 
 
 75.  $157 million × 0.28 amounts to a $44.0 million income tax reduction, plus (54.26 − 5) × 
2.9 million × 0.2, or $28.6 million in avoided capital gains. 
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means that backdating is not inherently cooperative. An individual can 
decide to harvest tax benefits from backdating without any accomplice. 
The donor simply misreports the gift date on their SEC filing and then 
claims the deduction associated with that date.76  
Accordingly, backdating is not a substitute for insider trading. 
However, it is a substitute to other forms of manipulative giving that 
are substitutes of insider trading. It is also complementary because 
backdating can be used alongside other giving strategies. The next 
Section explains how layering backdating on top of other strategies can 
amplify an insider’s gains from giving. 
5. A Combination of Manipulative Strategies.  These manipulative 
strategies are not mutually exclusive: an insider can use information, 
influence, and backdating in the same gift. To see this, consider what 
happened a month after Smith’s November 3 filing: a stupendous drop 
in altitude for the stock price, down to $38.79 (about a 45 percent drop 
from October 9), owing to the turbulent events beyond the company’s 
control. On December 4, JetBlue announced “a challenging revenue 
environment” related to “depressed traffic to southern California 
earlier this quarter due to the fires there.”77 All those fires had begun 
 
 76.  Importantly, the insider need not secure the complicity of the recipient charity. A 
foundation that receives a gift on November 3 is not obliged to corroborate the donor’s fraudulent 
Form 4 declaration or tax filing, in which October 4 is presented as the gift date. The foundation 
does not coauthor those documents and has no incentive to proactively request these documents 
and report discrepancies to the government. Most foundations do not make a public filing of their 
received gifts that the SEC can audit and associate with purported gift dates. Although public 
charities must annually disclose to the IRS what donations they receive each year, the IRS is 
forbidden from sharing this information. Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting 
Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,959, 31,963 (May 28, 2020) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 56); New IRS Rule Allows Many Nonprofits To Withhold Donor 
Information From the IRS, NOSSAMAN LLP (May 28, 2020), https://www.nossaman.com/ 
newsroom-insights-new-irs-rule-allows-many-nonprofits-to-withhold-donor-iInformation-from-
the-IRS [https://perma.cc/6A9K-4PAS]. For private foundations, the donor and gift date are 
publicly available, Schedule of Contributors (Schedule B), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990ezb.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3VJ-AWWV], but there is no easy way to search this data and 
reconcile it with Form 4 and Form 5 filings. Construction of such a database would be useful for 
scholars and regulators going forward.  
 77.  Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Airways Reports November Traffic; Revises Fourth 
Quarter Earnings Guidance (Dec. 4, 2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/ 
press-releases/2003/12-04-2003-015143526 [https://perma.cc/2BU6-959M]; JetBlue Airways 
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
0001158463/000104746903039481/a2124113z8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y5A-VUEW]. 
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by November 3,78 suggesting that the board already knew on November 
3 that JetBlue was going to have a hard time for the rest of the year.  
Suppose that Smith had met in November with his two associates 
on the board of JetBlue and indicated that he would make a year-end 
sale or gift of stock. One can imagine the directors firmly reminding 
Smith that California has had a tragic autumn and that the events 
surely would impact an air carrier. Taking the hint, Smith might decide 
to accelerate his gift by a month. Having resolved to jump the gun, he 
might nevertheless backdate the gift from November 3 to October 9 to 
take advantage of the high price with perfect hindsight. Finally, he 
might discourage the board from making negative disclosures about 
the impact of the fires for a few days to draw less attention to the 
excellent timing of the transaction and ensure that he dodges the bullet.  
This combination of strategies would allow Smith to give stock 
worth $157 million but claim a $192 million deduction worth $90 
million in tax savings.79 He would avoid having to give at the low 
December price of $38.79, which would have left the foundation with 
only $112 million and delivered tax savings of only $51.1 million.80 The 
combination of backdating and access strategies almost double the 
value of Smith’s tax benefits. Indeed, the sale price for the stock in 
December would have been only slightly greater than the tax benefit 
obtained in November. Thus, Smith obtained $90 million in tax 
savings,81 while still making a jaw-dropping gift to a charity he controls, 
compared to only $112 million from an outright sale. Had the stock 
 
 78.  Hayley Fox, 2003 Wildfires: Memories Linger, Firefighting Techniques Evolve After the 
Largest Fire in California History (Map), KPCC (Oct. 25, 2013), https://archive.kpcc.org/news/ 
2013/10/25/39939/2003-wildfires-10-years-after-the-largest-fire-in [https://perma.cc/49LH-3KEB]. 
 79.  Recall that a gift of stock worth $192 million reduces the donor’s income by that amount, 
saving the donor the marginal tax rate times the gift (here $192 million × 0.28 = $54 million). Such 
a gift also avoids the capital gains tax that would occur if a sale and gift of cash were made. The 
savings is $36 million if we take $192 million to be the relevant baseline ($192 − (2.9 million shares 
× $5 basis) × 0.2), giving a total tax benefit of $90 million. One might instead consider the capital 
gains from a December sale as the relevant savings. In that case, the capital gains avoided would 
be worth 0.2 × ($38.79 − $5) which is $6.76 per share or $19.6 million. The total tax savings would 
be $74 million, rather than $90 million. 
 80.  The foundation would get $112 million because that is the December share price 
($38.79) times the number of shares (2.9 million). Avoided capital gains of .2 × ($38.79 − $5) are 
worth $6.76 per share. Add to that reduced income of $38.79 × .28 worth $10.86 per share, and 
the total tax benefit is $17.62 per share.  
 81.  Supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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price fallen a little further, to $31 or below, he would have netted more 
money from a manipulative gift than an honest sale.82  
As this scenario illustrates, multiple manipulative strategies can 
work in concert. About half of the value of Smith’s increased tax 
benefits could come from access strategies and half from backdating. 
To reiterate, this Article does not claim that Soros or anyone at JetBlue 
actually used these manipulative strategies. Rather, the intent is to 
explain these strategies in a hypothetical situation about a similarly 
situated shareholder.83 Moreover, a prominent investor would be 
unwise to use manipulative strategies if they pose a large legal and 
reputational risk. The next Part turns to the legality of these gifts. 
II. THE LAW OF INSIDER GIVING 
It has been said that “there’s no law against insider giving.”84 This 
is untrue. Numerous laws bear on insider giving, exposing the 
manipulative insider and those who abet her to civil and criminal 
liability. However, it is fair to say that the law on manipulative giving 
is somewhat more permissive than the law on insider trading, and it is 
certainly true that the odds of detection and prosecution are much 
lower for strategic gifts than sales. Accordingly, the law may 
inadvertently encourage insiders to consider manipulative giving a 
viable option. 
Several bodies of law bear on insider trading, insider giving, and 
gifts of stock generally. The laws governing this domain regulate 
information sharing, use of information in transactions, suspect trading 
 
 82.  At $31 per share, a sale yields less than $90 million. But as the hypothetical showed, 
Smith would make $90 million in tax savings from the gift. The break-even point is higher (a gift 
is more attractive than a sale) if the marginal tax rate is treated as higher than 28 percent. At 45 
percent, the tax savings grow to $192 million × 0.45 = $86.4 million plus the capital gains savings 
of $36 million. The total tax savings is then $122.4 million, which is the amount realized by a sale 
at $42.21 per share. The break-even price is lower if a different capital gains baseline is used for 
comparison.  
 83.  See Andrea Fuller, Hundreds of People Made Gifts of Stock with Great Timing, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 1:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds-of-people-made-gifts-of-
stock-with-great-timing-1513881239 [https://perma.cc/7F9M-2XXM] (chronicling how hundreds 
of people donated stock to charities near price peaks to take advantage of potential tax 
deductions).  
 84.  Francis et al., supra note 5. This view is widespread. It depends in part upon an undue 
focus on just insider trading jurisprudence under SEC Rule 10b-5. While we argue that even 10b-
5 may allow insider giving liability, it is far from the only applicable legal rule. We discuss both 
points in this Part.  
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(even if lacking inside information), disclosure of transactions, and tax 
treatment of charitable gifts. This Part reviews the law governing those 
functional operations, one by one, with an eye to their application to 
manipulative giving. Section A describes federal and state rules 
discouraging selective disclosure of material nonpublic information 
that might support gifts. Section B describes federal law constraining 
transactions, such as sales and gifts. Section C goes on to discuss the 
federally mandated public disclosure of gifts, and Section D explains 
valuation rules for gifts under federal tax law.  
A. Disclosure Rules 
Federal securities law requires issuers to share information in 
some contexts but forbids it in others.85 State corporate law likewise 
sets out rules for transparency and opacity. In both contexts, the 
operating policy favors some measure of equal access to information, 
albeit under different conceptions. Securities law favors equal access 
by all potential traders, while corporate law favors equal access by all 
investors. If effective, each of these disclosure rules would cut down on 
inappropriate selective sharing of corporate information and the 
trading and gifting that may follow. However, these rules operate 
differently for gifts than trades and are certainly less restrictive.  
1. Securities Law Disfavors Selective Disclosure for Insider Giving.  
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
establish a system of mandatory disclosure.86 Businesses must disclose 
vast quantities of information when selling securities to the public87 and 
quarterly thereafter,88 with occasional updates for specific events.89 In 
general, additional disclosures are permitted, and even selective 
disclosures—with management leaking secrets to a favored financial 
 
 85.  See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3 (2001) (describing information that is forbidden to be disclosed such as certain pending 
offerings). 
 86.  Cf. Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
599, 605 (2013) (remarking that disclosure is the essence of federal securities law). 
 87.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b)–(c), 78l; 17 C.F.R. § 230.404 (2020) (providing a list of 
information that must be disclosed). 
 88.  See Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2020) (denoting rules for quarterly reports); see 
also Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2020) (same for annual and transition reports).  
 89.  See Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2021) (form for disclosure of information required 
by Regulation FD). 
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analyst to curry favor—appear to be contemplated.90 Nevertheless a 
number of limitations apply.91  
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Regulation FD”) was promulgated 
in response to a widespread perception that executives were able to 
corrupt stock analysts by offering them preferential access to 
information; the analysts then parlayed this information on to their 
trading clients, who would scoop the market.92 Regulation FD 
accordingly forbids issuers from disclosing material nonpublic 
information to many kinds of market professionals.93 Importantly, 
Regulation FD bars selective disclosure to institutional investors, such 
as hedge funds, even if there is no hint that the disclosure will lead to a 
sale.94  
However, Regulation FD applies differently to individual 
investors who are not among the enumerated market professionals. 
The rule only constrains selective disclosures to such investors “under 
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will 
purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the information.”95 
Thus, Regulation FD does not prohibit disclosure when it is reasonable 
to think that the listener would not buy or sell.96 Does a giver of 
securities “sell” them for the purposes of Regulation FD? There is no 
law directly on point. It is probable that a court would reason by 
analogy from SEC Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. This jurisprudence is 
discussed in Section 2.B.2, but it is fair to say there is substantial 
 
 90.  Powell famously built this rationale into Dirks, the case originating the contemporary 
law of insider trading for tippers and tippees. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–79 (1983); see 
also Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 551–65 
(2017) (criticizing the continued use of this rationale and the personal benefit test based on it). 
 91.  See Mahoney, supra note 85, at 3 (describing the information forbidden to be disclosed). 
 92.  See Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, SEC (Aug. 
10, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm [https://perma.cc/AE7T-V6XB].  
 93.  17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2020) (“Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, 
discloses any material nonpublic information . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that 
information . . . .”). Among the market professionals are brokers, dealers, investment advisors, 
investment managers, and investment companies, and their various affiliates. Id. § 243.100(b)(1) 
(2020). 
 94.  Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii–iii) (2020). 
 95.  Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2020). 
 96.  To be sure, there is a reasonable case that gifts are sales, so prudent executives might 
honor Regulation FD’s spirit by staying mum. Moreover, it is a fair question why executives would 
not reasonably foresee a sale when delivering bad news to an investor—given how many people 
are initially skeptical of insider giving as a substitute for insider trading, it may be more reasonable 
to expect trading. 
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uncertainty on the point.97 Regardless, executives may think that it is 
somewhat safe to share information with natural persons owning 
significant stakes in their companies because such persons are often not 
among the restricted market professionals, so sharing with them is not 
a per se violation of Regulation FD. 
2. Corporate Law Disfavors Selective Disclosure for Insider 
Giving.  State corporate law vests shareholders with rights to obtain 
information about the businesses of which they hold shares.98 Most 
prominent among the shareholder’s arsenal is the books and records 
request,99 which permits a shareholder to demand, review, and copy 
many kinds of corporate information in order to value their investment 
or for some other lawful purpose.100 And beyond the statutory 
framework, shareholders can use contracts to secure greater 
information rights or utilize informal ties to executives to simply ask 
for more.101 Moreover, corporate law sometimes permits officers and 
directors to share information selectively, especially with the 
shareholder who advocated for their inclusion in the company’s 
management.102 
However, shareholder information access is not unlimited. “The 
directors’ duty to disclose all available material information in 
connection with a request for shareholder action must be balanced 
 
 97.  Infra Part II.B.2. 
 98.  LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ANDREW VERSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 273 (2020). 
 99.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2020) (describing the rights of stockholders to make 
copies of books and records).  
 100.  AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 243 A.3d 417, 425 (Del. 
2020). 
 101.  Infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Kalisman v. Friedman, No. 8447–VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013) 
(“When a director serves as the designee of a stockholder on the board, and when it is understood 
that the director acts as the stockholder’s representative, then the stockholder is generally entitled 
to the same information as the director.”); see Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 
122 (Del. Ch. 2000) (endorsing that director was duty-bound to share the information with the 
shareholder who nominated him); see also J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights 
and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 56 (2015) (“The better approach, which 
Delaware has adopted, is therefore to permit information sharing and allow corporations to 
address risks by contracting with the affiliate and by enforcing the directors’ fiduciary duties.”); 
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a 
Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 45 (“Absent contractual provisions to the contrary, Delaware 
law permits constituent directors to disclose information to their sponsors so long as they do so in 
a manner that is consistent with their fiduciary duties.”). 
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against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in 
particular, by keeping certain financial information confidential.”103 
Apart from the threshold question of whether it is appropriate for any 
particular item to be disclosed, a separate question concerns whether 
officers and directors breach their duties by disclosing to just select 
shareholders.104 Corporate law tends to emphasize equality among 
shareholders.105 For example, transactions in which a powerful 
shareholder obtains different benefits than the rest of the group are 
often subject to challenge under the exacting entire fairness 
standard.106 Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders as a class, even when they have deep ties to a particular 
shareholder.107 These rules establish a strong norm against selective 
disclosure of information to just the shareholders employing or 
sponsoring “constituency” directors.108  
 
 103.  Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998). 
 104.  See generally Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 
(2011) (exploring the idea that there might be exceptions to blanket rule of confidentiality). 
 105.  See David M. Morris, Lois Herzeca & Julie E. Kamps, Designated Directors and 
Designating Investors: Early Planning Is Key, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 5, 5 (2008) 
(“Under New York and Delaware law, designated directors (also known as ‘representative’ or 
‘constituency’ directors) have the same fiduciary duties as other directors to the corporations on 
whose board they serve.”); see also Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1663-N, 2006 WL 
1586375, at *4 n.49 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (“As directors . . . the individual defendants owed 
fiduciary duties to the Company.”); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16 (4th ed. Supp. 
2021-22) (“[T]he duties of directors designated by large stockholders are clear: under Weinberger, 
they still owe the corporation and its shareholders an uncompromising duty of loyalty.”); 1 
EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.7 (5th ed. 2006) (“[T]he law does not recognize a special 
duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class electing them. Rather, the law 
demands directors’ fidelity toward the corporation and all of its stockholders.”). 
 106.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Under this standard of 
review, the board or shareholder bears the burden of proving the fair price and fair process of a 
challenged transaction. Id.  
 107.  Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
27, 1987) (holding that there is no “special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class 
to the class electing them”). 
 108.  See Holdgreiwe v. Nostalgia Network, Inc., No. 12914, 1993 WL 144604, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 29, 1993) (“[Director] is already under an obligation to maintain the confidences of 
[corporation]; to use its confidential information only to inform discussion among directors and 
action by the board or a committee. Disclosure of such information to [shareholder] is a violation 
of duty whether or not an undertaking is entered.”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency 
Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 775 (2008) (“Constituency directors may breach their fiduciary duty 
of loyalty by transmitting confidential corporate information to their sponsors despite any 
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Although the precise boundaries of selective sharing are not clear, 
three important takeaways are clear. First, selective disclosure to a 
shareholder can violate an officer or director’s fiduciary duty if the 
disclosure is not in the interests of the corporation.109 For example, a 
director who shares corporate information with a friend in exchange 
for a bribe would violate corporate norms just as much as if she shares 
the corporation’s secret cola recipe in exchange for a bribe. 
Second, nothing in that determination treats insider gifts 
differently than insider trades. If it violates norms of equal treatment 
to give a valuable trading opportunity to a single investor, it equally 
violates those norms to confer a valuable donative opportunity. If it 
harms a corporation to leak secrets to a trading shareholder, it likewise 
violates a manager’s duties to share corporate information with a 
shareholder intent upon a similarly harmful gift. The question, of 
course, is whether and when gifts can be harmful to the corporation—
a question this Article takes up later.110  
Third, informed gifts by shareholders are inherently more 
suspicious than similar gifts by officers and directors. That is because 
there is no question that officers and directors ought to have material 
nonpublic information about the firms they run. Their jobs require that 
information. For officers and directors, the only question is whether 
they have misused the information by trading, gifting, or otherwise. By 
contrast, any time a shareholder engages in a trade based on material 
nonpublic information, it must be asked whether it was appropriate for 
the shareholder to possess that information. There is nothing in a 
shareholder’s role that requires them to be briefed on all nonpublic 
matters, and it is quite often inappropriate for them to be so informed. 
When courts find that insiders have shared information with 
shareholders, who then make gifts, a serious examination is required 
to see if that sharing was a breach of duty.111  
 
contractual expectations to the contrary.”); Comm. on Corp. L., ABA Section of Bus. L., 
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Fifth Edition, 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1500 (2007) [hereinafter 
Corporate Director’s Guidebook] (“A director must keep confidential all matters involving the 
corporation that have not been disclosed to the public.”). 
 109.  In re Dole Food Co., No. 9079-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *43 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) 
(holding that “a fiduciary sharing of information with an affiliated stockholder and its advisors, 
standing alone, is not inherently a breach of duty” and that “[t]he use and sharing of information 
is rather another context-dependent inquiry”). 
 110.  Infra Part IV.B.1. 
 111.  Infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
2021] INSIDER GIVING 647 
B. Transaction Rules 
Several bodies of law constrain a person’s ability to trade after 
learning corporate secrets. Federal insider trading law attracts the most 
attention; each year it leads to dozens of civil enforcement actions and 
a handful of criminal convictions.112 Although the issue is not fully 
resolved, it is likely that Rule 10b-5, the mainstay of insider trading 
enforcement, applies to manipulative gifts. Less attention is given to 
other legal authority constraining insider trading and manipulative 
giving, such as federal wire fraud statutes and state corporate law, 
which plainly could apply to gifts. The import is that insider giving is 
often illegal, and it is false to say that there is no law against insider 
giving, but that enforcement requires plaintiffs or the government to 
reach for less familiar tools or seize upon less common facts, putting 
manipulative giving in a privileged position. 
1. The Short-Swing Profits Rule Does Not Constrain Insider 
Giving.  The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act” or “1934 Act”) 
prohibits corporate insiders (defined as officers, directors, and 
shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the company’s shares) 
from making a profit by buying and selling (or selling and then buying) 
their company’s stock within six months at a profit.113 Because 16(b) is 
mechanically applied and not subject to the far more complicated 
requirements of 10b-5, one might anticipate it to be an apt tool for 
preventing manipulative gifting. But 16(b) is of no help, for it exempts 
bona fide gifts to a charity.114 Thus, a trader who could not legally buy 
shares at a low price and then sell them during a temporary spike can 
buy shares and then gift them during a temporary spike without 
violating 16(b). On this point of law, there is plainly less regulation of 
gifts than sales. The same cannot be said of many other points discussed 
below. 
 
 112.  LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 98, at 534. 
 113.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
 114.  17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2020); accord Dreiling ex rel. Infospace, Inc. v. Kellett, 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 1215, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding acknowledges the law exempting charitable 
gifts). 
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2. Rule 10b-5 Prohibits Some Insider Giving.  Section 10b of the 
1934 Act115 and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5116 prohibit fraud “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”117 Although 
neither refers to insider trading, the viability of insider trading claims 
based on those provisions has been confirmed by years of caselaw,118 
administrative rulemaking,119 and statutory amendments.120 The 
resulting doctrine is complex,121 and this Article will not rehash the 
various theories and their subtle requirements. For present purposes, 
the key question concerns whether 10b-5’s “purchase or sale” 
requirement applies to insider gifts.122 The rule does not mention gifts, 
so it is natural to think that Rule 10b-5 is not applicable if a shareholder 
merely gives stock away.123 But the analysis is actually more 
complicated. 
One complication is that 10b-5 does not require that the sale itself 
be the locus of all the elements of the fraud. The only requirement is 
that the transaction be “in connection with” the sale of a security. As 
long as a manipulative gift is “in connection with” a subsequent sale, a 
10b-5 insider trading action should be available. This is significant 
because stocks are not heirlooms, kept on the recipient’s mantle 
forever: recipients of gifts tend to sell the stock.  
This resale can happen for one of three reasons. First, the gift 
recipient may be a foundation controlled by the giver. Many gifts of 
 
 115.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 116.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015). 
 117.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 118.  E.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (allowing the 
plaintiffs to bring complaints for insider trading practices based on Section 10b and Rule 10b-5); 
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (same).  
 119.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 & 249) (adopting new rules for the enforcement of insider 
trading based on SEC Rule 10b-5).  
 120.  Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to 
increase the sanctions against insider trading). 
 121.  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of 
Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429 (discussing the issues that have arisen from the 
complex evolution of insider trading doctrine). 
 122.  This analysis takes for granted a situation where an insider would be liable were the 
transaction a sale in order to ask what the results for a gift would be.  
 123.  See Portnoy v. Memorex Corp., 667 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 
10b-5’s definition of “buy” and “sell” does not include gifts). 
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
2021] INSIDER GIVING 649 
stock are directed toward the giver’s own pet charity.124 Just as the 
shareholder did not want to own stock while it drops in value, the 
shareholder may want the charity to realize gains before bad news is 
disclosed. Thus, an individual might misappropriate information or 
inappropriately obtain it as a tippee, gift it to her pet charity, and then 
cause the charity to promptly sell the stock. It seems plausible that 
these facts satisfy the elements of 10b-5, because the insider giver is 
also personally trading (albeit through a charitable entity). Indeed, the 
selling charity would be in violation of 10b-5 for selling when its 
decisionmaker has so acted, and with the decisionmaker derivatively 
liable. Accordingly, in SEC v. Zomax,125 the SEC successfully brought 
an insider trading action against two executives who sold stock (both 
directly and through a trust they controlled) on the basis of material 
nonpublic information that the company’s revenue and earnings would 
be considerably lower than expected.126 The defendants settled the case 
for more than $2 million.127  
Second, the giver may tip the charity that it would be wise to 
promptly sell the securities. On these facts, the charity is plausibly a 
tippee, the recipient of a tip who has made no assurance of 
confidentiality. A tippee is liable if she “knows or should know that 
there has been a breach” by whichever insider shared the 
information—whether it be her immediate source (the donating 
shareholder) or someone higher up the chain.128 The charity has 
become a “participa[nt] after the fact.”129 Tippees are usually only 
liable if the tipper has received a personal benefit in exchange for their 
tipping information, but given the expansiveness of the personal 
benefit test, this element will often be present.130 Many charities confer 
reputational benefits on their donors.131 Dirks v. SEC,132 the case that 
introduces the insider trading law of tippers, explicitly identifies a 
 
 124.  Yermack, supra note 12, at 123. 
 125.  Zomax, Inc. et al., Exchange Act Release No. 19262, 85 SEC Docket 1875 (June 9, 2005). 
 126.  Id. at 1885. 
 127.  Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Two of Zomax 
Inc.’s Former Officers and Files Settled Financial Reporting Charges Against Zomax, Inc. and 
Two of Its Officers (June 9, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19262.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H9MT-WXPU].  
 128.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 129.  WILLIAM WANG & MARC STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 401 (3d ed. 2010).  
 130.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.  
 131.  Supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 132.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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reputational benefit as a sufficient personal benefit.133 And as already 
seen, the tax benefits of manipulative gifts can sometimes be 
substantial—potentially greater than making no gift at all.134 
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the SEC has successfully argued 
that a donor’s tax benefit constitutes a personal benefit. In SEC v. 
Buntrock,135 Waste Management’s CEO gave a gift of 100,000 shares 
to his college alma mater days before the new management stated that 
the previous year’s statements were inflated.136 The SEC alleged, and 
was successful in arguing, that “[t]hrough the gift of inflated stock, 
Buntrock was unjustly enriched in the form of the increased tax 
benefit.”137  
Third, even when the giver neither controls nor offers hints to the 
charity, the charity is nevertheless likely to resell the securities—
prompt sale is considered a best practice138 and is widely undertaken.139 
Indeed, many charities make it their official policy.140 Several reasons 
support prompt sale. First, charities need cash to fulfill their 
 
 133.  Id. at 663. 
 134.  Supra Parts I.C.–D.  
 135.  SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02-C-2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002). 
 136.  Id. The case was settled with entry of an injunction against future violations of the 
Exchange Act and disgorgement. SEC v. Buntrock, Exchange Act Release No. 19351 (Aug. 29, 
2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19351.htm [https://perma.cc/ZD79-TTBZ].  
 137.  Complaint at 132, SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02-C-2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002). 
 138.  Receiving Gifts of Stock, CTR. FOR FAITH & GIVING (Jan. 21, 2016, 12:00 PM), 
https://centerforfaithandgiving.org/2016/01/receiving-gifts-of-stock [https://perma.cc/BXP3-
MYHH] (“We recommend that you sell all stock gifts as soon as they are received . . . .”); Todd 
Kimball, Accounting and Reporting for Stock Gift Donations to Nonprofits, CFO SELECTIONS 
(Mar. 3, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.cfoselections.com/perspective/accounting-and-reporting-
for-stock-gift-donations-to-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/F6FT-Q3SK] (“The best and most 
commonly used practice is to sell all stock immediately upon receipt.”). 
 139.  CHRISTOPHER R. HOYT, CV041 ALI-CLE 223, PLANNING FOR MAXIMUM TAX 
BENEFITS FROM CHARITABLE GIFTS BY CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS (2014) 
(“Second, a large block of donated stock will usually not conform to the charity’s investment 
policy. The charity will prefer to diversify and put the proceeds in its investment pool.”). 
 140.  Briana Peters, How To Handle Stock Donations, HAWKINS ASH CPAS (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://hawkinsashcpas.com/how-to-handle-stock-donations [https://perma.cc/RR5S-59YZ] 
(“Many organizations have a gift policy which requires that gifts of stock are liquidated upon 
receipt to minimize the risk associated with the stock market.”); see also, e.g., Financial Donations, 
HESED HOUSE, https://www.hesedhouse.org/financial-donations [https://perma.cc/S4KT-JUYV] 
(“Upon receipt of the stock gift into our brokerage firm, it is Hesed House’s policy to immediately 
sell the stock donation.”); Dickinson v. Comm’r, 120 T.C.M. (RIA) 2020-128 (2020) (explaining 
that Fidelity “‘has a donor advised fund program which incorporates procedures requiring . . . 
[Fidelity] to immediately liquidate the donated stock’ and ‘seeks an imminent exit strategy and, 
therefore, promptly tenders the donated stock to the issuer for cash’” (alteration in original)).  
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objectives.141 Second, charity managers are fiduciaries, bound to wisely 
steward the money of their charity. That mandate is almost universally 
understood to require diversification of the charity’s portfolio.142 The 
receipt of a large quantity of a single issuer’s securities necessarily 
requires a large sale to rebalance the portfolio.143 A final reason that 
charities will sell is that they are not dumb. They understand that 
donors tend to donate before troubling disclosures, not after.144 Some 
academic research confirms that it is common wisdom for charities to 
assume that the donor would advise them to sell if only they were 
permitted to speak.145 
If charities promptly sell the shares they receive, and if the reason 
for the gift is itself nonpublic information about the company’s 
prospects, insiders should typically understand that their gifts may 
constitute tips, given with the expectation that the recipient will 
trade.146 Indeed, the only time an insider would be reasonable to expect 
the charity to retain the securities is when the insider controls the 
charity and decides to let the charity hold the bag at the time of the 
adverse disclosure. 
So far, this Article has examined the ways that a straightforward 
sale might be found in connection with the insider’s gift. But, securities 
 
 141.  HOYT, supra note 139. 
 142.  See UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(4) 
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.) (urging diversification); UNIFORM PRUDENT 
INVESTOR ACT (UPIA) § 3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.) (urging same). But 
see UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 4 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.) 
(“No positive rule can be stated with respect to what constitutes a reasonable time for the sale or 
exchange of securities.” (citation omitted)). 
 143.  See Douglas Moore & Mitchell K. Higgins, Planning and Investing Strategies for Private 
Foundations, 15 TAX’N EXEMPTS 156, 161 (2004); HOYT, supra note 139. 
 144.  An interesting question is whether a given charity violates the law by trading while aware 
that the donors tend to give in advance of negative disclosures. In many cases where a donor 
would be liable as a tipper, the trading charity would be liable as a tippee. However, the details 
of this analysis are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on the conduct and liability of major 
shareholders. 
 145.  Valentina Salotti & Mark L. Power, Market Timing of Individuals’ Charitable 
Donations to an Educational Foundation 7 n.2 (June 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (“Anecdotally, Foundation staff indicated that it was their position that stock donors had 
more knowledge about the stock donated than the Foundation, implying that they thought the 
stock was overvalued.”). 
 146.  United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that insider trading 
occurs when an insider “‘disclos[es] inside information as a gift . . . with the expectation that [the 
recipient] would trade’ on the basis of such information or otherwise exploit it for his pecuniary 
gain” (alteration in original) (quoting Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016))). 
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law generally adopts a radically more expansive definition of “sale” 
than does ordinary English, thus permitting a second possible reason 
to doubt the legal immunity of insider givers.147 The 1934 Act defines 
“sale” broadly: “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract 
to sell or otherwise dispose of [securities].”148 A person who gives 
something away certainly disposes of it, which would make the insider’s 
gift of securities to the charity itself a sale for the purposes of federal 
insider trading law. Moreover, the use of the term “include” suggests 
that the actual definition of the word “sale” goes beyond just these 
enumerated items.149 
Bona fide gifts of securities have generally not been deemed 
“sales” for the purposes of federal antifraud law.150 However, courts 
have held that gifts are sales “when the purpose of the ‘gift’ is to 
advance the donor’s economic objectives rather than to make a gift for 
simple reasons of generosity.”151 So, for example, where a “free” stock 
distribution benefitted donors by attracting people to their website, the 
“gift” was deemed a “sale.”152 And federal courts have often used the 
gift analogy to illuminate core insider trading law issues. For example, 
in Dirks, the Supreme Court announced its tipper-tippee jurisprudence 
by reference to gifts—“The tip and trade resemble trading by the 
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”153 The 
court reasoned that tipping is illegal because it resembles a sale 
followed by a gift—so why not a gift followed by a sale?154 If sale and 
 
 147.  See Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 879 (2004) (discussing 
the expansive definition). 
 148. .15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (emphasis added). 
 149.  On inclusive and exclusive lists, see generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, 
Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (2015).  
 150.  See Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949); see also In re Complete Mgmt. 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 328 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting in a footnote, without analysis 
or citations, that one of the individual defendants in a securities fraud class action had “disposed 
of her CMI shares by gift, and thus we do not consider that activity to be improper insider 
trading”). 
 151.  Universalscience.com, Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7879, 2000 WL 1121540, 
at *2 (Aug. 8, 2000).  
 152.  Id.; see also Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (stating that there is no 
significant difference between the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act with respect to 
the definition of “sale”). Carol J. Sulcoski, Note, Looking a Gift of Stock in the Mouth: Donative 
Transfers and Rule 10b-5, 88 MICH. L. REV. 604, 619 (1989).  
 153.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 154.  In United States v. Martoma, the Second Circuit recently revived this type of analysis:  
Imagine that a corporate insider, instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to his 
doorman, gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on the information 
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gift are like encouraging someone to sell, then giving to someone 
expected to sell seems like a logical extension. 
Skeptics of insider giving are right to say that gifts are not always 
sales or in connection with sales, and so traditional 10b-5 insider 
trading analysis is not always straightforward. But there are several 
strong arguments for why many gifts on the basis of material nonpublic 
information violate federal antifraud laws. Furthermore, it is a mistake 
to assume that 10b-5 is the only relevant federal antifraud law. The next 
Section discusses additional paths to liability.  
3. Other Federal Law Prohibits Some Insider Giving.  Although 
10b-5 is the best known vehicle for an insider trading charge, other 
federal laws support similar charges—without the troublesome 
“purchase or sale” requirement. For example, the Department of 
Justice can bring insider trading cases under the federal mail fraud155 
and wire fraud statutes.156 This should come as no surprise. One of the 
best known insider trading cases, Carpenter v. United States,157 was 
prosecuted on this basis. There, a Wall Street Journal journalist leaked 
market-moving information about futures columns and was convicted 
of mail and wire fraud, not Rule 10b-5.158  
In general, the requirements for mail and wire fraud are the 
same,159 apart from the substrate (mails or wires) used: “(1) having 
devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform 
specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of 
executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified 
fraudulent acts).”160 However, convictions for wire and mail fraud for 
insider trading are often easier for prosecutors to obtain than many 
 
and consider the proceeds of the trade to be his end-of-year gift. In this example, there 
may not be a “meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and tippee, 
yet this clearly is an illustration of prohibited insider trading, as the insider has given a 
tip of valuable inside information in lieu of a cash gift and has thus personally 
benefitted from the disclosure. 
869 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 155.  18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 156.  Id. § 1343. 
 157.  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 158.  Id. at 22, 24. 
 159.  Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005) (“[W]e have construed 
identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia.”); Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 
n.6 (“The mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly 
we apply the same analysis to both sets of [insider trading/tipping] offenses here.”). 
 160.  Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989). 
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criminal actions under 10b-5.161 Importantly, there is no “purchase or 
sale” requirement. No transaction of any kind is required, so it is 
plainly no disqualification that a gift took place rather than a sale.162 To 
the contrary, the mail and wire fraud statutes specifically note that gifts 
stand on equal footing with sales. The statute bans fraudulent schemes 
“to sell” or “give away” any security.163  
Wire and mail fraud do require fraud or fraudulent scheme, 
though those terms are expansive and can easily apply to an insider gift. 
First, shareholders who implicitly promise confidentiality to their 
manager-source have defrauded that immediate source.164 
Shareholders who obtain the secret from a manager who breached a 
duty to the issuer by sharing it have helped defraud the ultimate source 
of exclusive use of the information and are liable as such. A wire or 
mail fraud case in no way requires that the insiders profited from the 
 
 161.  William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal 
Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 220, 256 (2015) (“Rule 
10b-5 misappropriation is more difficult to prove than mail and wire fraud.”). 
 162. For those who would nevertheless like to find a sale, there is also ample precedent for 
treating the downstream sale by the charity as part of the fraudulent scheme. Consider the facts 
of Schmuck v. United States and how they might track onto an insider gift. 489 U.S. 705 (1989). In 
that case, an individual (Schmuck) falsified odometers on cars and then sold them to dealers. Id. 
at 707. The unknowing dealers then sold the cars to the public and mailed a title application with 
mileage to the secretary of state. Id. The dealers did not commit fraud because they did not know 
the mileage was false; Schmuck did not mail anything false. See id. at 707–08. But Schmuck caused 
people to sell things in a context of error which, if the seller knew what she was doing, would have 
been fraudulent. Schmuck’s conviction was upheld. Id. at 722. The U.S. Supreme Court likewise 
noted that Schmuck’s scheme depended on the good will of his dealer-customers, which would 
have faltered if the secretary of state or downstream customers learned the truth about the cars. 
Id. at 714. An insider who gives stock to a charity, knowing the charity will then sell it, and that 
the charity would violate federal antifraud law if it knew what the insider knows about the 
security, would seem analogous. Also in parallel, the insider’s pattern of palming securities off 
onto charities at the crest of the market will not be successful if downstream customers discover 
that the securities were given with bad news in sight. 
 163.  18 U.S.C. § 1341.  
 164.  This is akin to the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading endorsed in United States 
v. O’Hagan. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997). It is also applicable to mail and wire fraud cases, as 
evidenced by the fact that Carpenter v. United States is plainly a misappropriation case. 484 U.S. 
19, 24 (1987). 
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scheme.165 The scheme merely needs to violate a cognizable “property 
right,” which a corporation’s exclusive use of information surely is.166 
In addition, , Section 1348 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”) also includes a second federal theory lacking a “purchase or 
sale” requirement: criminal securities fraud.167 These provisions were 
enacted by Congress to “provide prosecutors with a different—and 
broader—enforcement mechanism to address securities fraud than 
what had been previously provided.”168  
To secure a conviction for insider trading under SOX, the 
government needs to show only that the defendant acted with 
fraudulent intent and attempted to execute or executed a scheme or 
artifice to defraud, which had a nexus with a security.169 In United States 
v. Mahaffy,170 the defendants argued that an indictment could not be 
sustained because they did not intend to cause any economic loss to 
any actual or putative shareholder of the securities in question.171 
Rejecting that argument, the court explained that the statute “does not 
restrict, or even contemplate, the status of the victim.”172 Therefore, it 
was sufficient that “the defendants either benefitted, or attempted to 
benefit, from trading in securities.”173 Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in United States v. O’Hagan,174 fraud is committed “in connection 
with” a security when confidential information is misappropriated for 
trading purposes.175  
 
 165.  Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25–26. Carpenter was decided before a 1988 amendment intended 
to expand the reach of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which was limited in 2010 in Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010). The post-Skilling law is likely the same on this point as was 
true in Carpenter. Wang, supra note 161, at 248. 
 166.  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 655 n.6. Every opinion also affirmed this point on mail 
fraud. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 680 (Thomas, J., and 
Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 167.  18 U.S.C. § 1348. For an overview of the new provisions, see also HAROLD S. 
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 10:2 (2020). 
 168.  United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. 
Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d. Cir. 2019)). 
 169.  United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05–CR–613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 
2006).  
 170.  United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05–CR–613, 2006 WL 2224518 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006). 
 171.  Id. at *12. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
 175.  Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678). 
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These principles suggest that SOX, which was intended to be 
broader in application than other securities fraud statutes, may well be 
a promising avenue for prosecuting gift-related fraud. Section 1348(1) 
does not require that the fraud be in connection with a purchase or sale. 
Nor, as Mahaffy teaches, does it require that the victims be (actual or 
prospective) shareholders. Thus, in the backdating scenario, where the 
false report is plainly sufficient to meet the fraud requirement, all three 
elements would be met (given that the defendant benefits from the 
fraud by receiving a tax deduction). Similarly, in the insider 
information and insider leakage scenarios, the misappropriation of 
information could very well satisfy all three requirements, in light of 
Mahaffy and O’Hagan.  
4. State Corporate Law Prohibits Some Insider Giving.  State 
corporate law includes its own prohibition on insider trading,176 often 
referred to as “Brophy” actions in reference to Delaware’s leading 
case.177 These claims derive from the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by 
an officer, director, or controlling shareholder.178 The duty of loyalty 
prohibits fiduciaries from misusing corporate assets for their own 
benefit, whether in trading or otherwise.179 It is not necessary for a 
successful Brophy claim that the plaintiff corporation incurred any 
harm as a result of the trade; rather, Brophy permits corporations to 
recover illicit gains, independent of loss.180 The core of such claims is 
that “it is inequitable to permit the fiduciary to profit from using 
confidential corporate information.”181 Given the breadth of the duty 
of loyalty, and the fact that Brophy actions are keyed to the benefits 
insiders enjoy from their use of corporate information, it is possible 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011). 
 177.  Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Del. Ch. 1949). Other states embraced similar 
precedents. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1969). 
 178.  Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8. In common law insider trading claims, stockholders are likely 
to be treated as constructive insiders. See, e.g., Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 102 (“Given 
the affiliation between the blockholder director and the stockholder and the understanding that 
information will flow from the blockholder director to the stockholder, the stockholder will be 
treated as a constructive insider for the purpose of the common law limitations on insider 
trading.”); Kahn, 23 A.3d at 837–38 (“[A]ctual harm to the corporation is not required for a 
plaintiff to state a claim under Brophy. . . . As the court recognized in Brophy, it is inequitable to 
permit the fiduciary to profit from using confidential corporate information. Even if the 
corporation did not suffer actual harm, equity requires disgorgement of that profit.”). 
 179.  Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8.  
 180.  Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 102. 
 181.  Brophy, 70 A.2d at 8; Kahn, 23 A.3d at 838 (emphasis added). 
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that a Brophy action could be brought against an insider who times a 
stock gift to capitalize on material nonpublic information. Insider 
givers capture benefits, in the form of tax deductions and reputation, 
that they would not capture if they used corporate information solely 
for its intended purpose.  
Yet Brophy actions are unlikely to deter much insider giving. First, 
these actions belong to the corporation.182 Shareholders cannot bring 
these actions if the board (or a special committee thereof) is capable of 
fairly considering the merits of potential litigation.183 Instead, 
corporate management decides whether the corporation should sue. 
Since managers of the company are the likely sources of information 
to any lucky shareholder, it is unlikely that they will frequently wish to 
unearth and litigate these indiscretions or sue the shareholders whose 
influence was great enough to secure information. Second, litigants 
may only bring these actions if they discover a violative gift. But 
shareholder-plaintiffs do not get to deploy wire taps or confidential 
agents the way that the Department of Justice does when pursuing a 
federal antifraud case. Instead, gifts are subject to only weak and 
delayed disclosures, with no accompanying information to document 
the information sharing. It is accordingly unlikely that derivative 
actions of this sort will blaze new trails.  
Finally, the typical recovery in a Brophy action is disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains.184 There are indeed gains when an insider makes a 
manipulative gift, but it will often be difficult to establish those gains 
with any certainty. Consider the marginally higher tax benefit obtained 
by giving at one point (the one supported by the inside information) 
 
 182.  See Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8. As the Delaware Court of Chancery explained,  
A Brophy claim is fundamentally derivative in nature, because it arises out of the 
misuse of corporate property—that is, confidential information—by a fiduciary of the 
corporation, for the benefit of the fiduciary and to the detriment of the corporation. 
The claim essentially arises out of agency law, which holds that an agent may not 
acquire a material benefit (other than from his principal) in connection with his 
position as agent. 
Latesco, L.P. v. Wayport, Inc., No. CIV.A. 4167-VCL, 2009 WL 2246793, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 
2009). 
 183.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 
932 (Del. 1993); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981). 
 184.  See Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Delaware law has 
long held—see Brophy v. Cities Service, Inc.—that directors who misuse company information to 
profit at the expense of innocent buyers of their stock should disgorge their profits. This doctrine 
is not designed to punish inadvertence, but to police intentional misconduct.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Richard A. Booth, Sense and Nonsense About Securities Litigation, 21 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 1, 19 n.47 (2018) (noting that the general rule under Brophy is that wrongdoers must 
disgorge any gain from improperly using corporate secrets). 
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
658  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:619 
relative to another (the moment the gift would otherwise have been 
made). How does one determine the counterfactual moment of the 
gift? And how does one prove that the alternative transaction would 
have been a lower value gift? Perhaps the shareholder would have sold 
the stock instead. Only in rare cases will the tax benefits of a well-timed 
gift exceed the sale price of the stock. Shareholders will usually be able 
to produce a baseline for comparison that presents their use of inside 
information as a but-for cause of losses rather than gains. Only if courts 
account for the altruistic and reputational gains enjoyed by donors—
those extra components that make a gift attractive relative to a sale 
even when the sale is for slightly more money—can they find gains in 
such cases. And such accounting is a challenge.  
Despite the numerous challenges to a successful Brophy action for 
insider giving, they are mostly about proof and litigation procedure. 
Unlike securities law, which is arguably tied to specific “purchase or 
sale” statutory language, state corporate law bars insider trading 
through ever-changing fiduciary case law. Given the right facts, a court 
would not be compelled to dismiss a Brophy action just because the 
challenged transaction is a gift. 
C. Reporting Rules 
When insiders transact, they must document it. Section 16(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires new officers, directors, 
and shareholders holding greater than 10 percent of the firm’s shares 
to publicly file most of their transactions within two business days on a 
Form 4.185 Thus, when a large shareholder sells even a single share, the 
public knows about it right away.186 Some transactions are, however, 
exempt from Form 4. Most notably, bona fide gifts may be omitted 
from Form 4.187  
Disclosure of stock gifts is required on Form 5,188 but that filing is 
anything but timely. Form 5 is an insider’s annual report, due within 45 
days of the end of a corporation’s fiscal year.189 It contains a summary 
 
 185.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745. 
 186.  While all sales require prompt disclosure, small purchases (those under $10,000) do not. 
They can be reported on a Form 5, with the same delay as a gift.  
 187.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (f)(1)(i) (2020) (exempting bona fide gifts from Section 16(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act).  
 188. See id. § 240.16a-3(f)(1)(i) (2020) (requiring disclosure of “[a]ll transactions during the 
most recent fiscal year that were exempt from section 16(b) of the Act”).  
 189.  Id. § 240.16a-3(a) (2020). 
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
2021] INSIDER GIVING 659 
of some of the transactions already reported on Form 4, as well as a 
grab bag of transactions exempt from Form 4.190 An insider who makes 
a gift of stock on the first day of an issuer’s fiscal year could wait 410 
days to disclose that gift on a Form 5.  
Not all insiders wait until their Form 5 filing to disclose their gift 
of stock. Anything that can be lawfully reported on a Form 5 can be 
disclosed on a Form 4 instead. But electing to disclose a gift on Form 4 
does not oblige the insider to comply with Form 4’s ordinary timeliness 
requirement. As long as the Form 4 reports the gift by the time a Form 
5 would have been required, the filing is lawful.191 Thus, a March 6 
Form 4 could contain stock sales from March 4 or 5 alongside stock 
gifts stretching back many months.  
Backdated gifts necessarily involve fraudulent filing of a Form 4 
or 5. For example, if an insider decides on March 6 that it would have 
been wise to give stock to a charity one month ago, on February 6, the 
investor can easily file a Form 4 or 5 reflecting a February 6 transaction 
date. That filing could take place on March 6 or many months later. 
The practical ability to report gifts long after they occur makes it simple 
to use gifts, rather than sales, to capitalize on backdating schemes. 
Filing a fraudulent date is at the insider’s fingertips—she need only 
write a different number, since there is no readily accessible public 
record of when the transaction took place. The odds of detection 
without an audit are accordingly small.192 The ease, however, does not 
ameliorate the violation. A backdated filing violates federal securities 
laws.  
D. Valuation Rules 
When donors claim a charitable deduction for their gift, they must 
assign a value to the gift for the purposes of the deduction. The general 
rule is that property should be deducted at its “fair market value” at 
 
 190. See Annual Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 5), SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form5.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA97-82JA]; Annual Statement of 
Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 5) General Instructions, SEC,  
https://www.sec.gov/files/form5data%2C0.pdf [https://perma.cc/72TD-9CRN]. 
 191. See Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 4), SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4data.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TZV-WJ2G] (“Form 5 
transactions to date may be included on this Form and subsequent Form 5 transactions may be 
reported on a later Form 4 or Form 5, provided all transactions are reported by the required 
date.”). 
 192.  See supra Part I.D.4. 
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the time of the gift.193 Treasury Regulations provide guidance for how 
to determine that value.194 In general, gifts of liquid stocks are valued 
at the midpoint of the highest and lowest trading prices of the day.195 
Donors who backdate their gifts violate this requirement. The fair 
market value of their gift is determined by the midpoint price on the 
date their gift actually occurred; the midpoint on some other day, 
selected precisely because it is a high price, is not the fair market 
value.196 
It may seem that well-timed gifts, which benefit from C-suite 
access but not backdating, pose no valuation risks; the insider who 
expects the stock to decline next week can lawfully donate stock today 
because the fair market value today is defined by Treasury Regulations 
to arise from today’s trading prices. On this view, there is no tax law 
problem with using corporate influence to maximize deductions. Yet 
this is mistaken. Gifts on the basis of material nonpublic information 
can constitute illegal valuation abuse.  
The starting point to see this is an attentive reading of 26 C.F.R. § 
20.2031-2, which governs the valuation of gifted securities. It begins 
with the governing rule, “The value of stocks and bonds is the fair 
market value per share or bond on the applicable valuation date.”197 It 
then states that “[i]n general” the midpoint of the high and low price 
“is the fair market value,”198 but the rule never states that this measure 
of fair market value is authoritative in all cases. To the contrary, the 
introductory signal “[i]n general” indicates that some stocks will have 
a midpoint price that is not the fair market value. If an insider claimed 
a deduction for the midpoint price of stock in a case where that price 
did not reflect fair market value, the insider will have misvalued the 
gift. 
This is not a mere textual possibility. There is widespread 
acceptance of at least two classes of cases where the fair market value 
of a gift is not its midpoint price. First, where a gift is given and then 
promptly sold, many tax practitioners and scholars believe that the sale 
 
 193.  26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(a)–(b)(1) (2020). 
 194.  See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 195.  See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 196.  26 U.S.C. § 2512(a). 
 197.  26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(a) (2020). 
 198.  Id. § 20.2031-2(b) (2020) (“In general, if there is a market for stocks or bonds, on a stock 
exchange, in an over-the-counter market, or otherwise, the mean between the highest and lowest 
quoted selling prices on the valuation date is the fair market value per share or bond.”). 
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price should be used to value the gift, even if it differs from the 
midpoint price.199 Accordingly, when an insider donates stock to a 
charity, and that charity holds the stock a short while and then sells the 
stock after bad news is disclosed, the insider may commit valuation 
fraud in claiming a deduction at the high midpoint price rather than the 
low actual sale price.  
Second, and more intriguingly, a recent advisory memo from the 
IRS Chief Counsel endorsed the view that insiders’ material nonpublic 
information about a stock can support a different fair value calculation 
than the midpoint price.200 In that memo, a donor gave securities at a 
time that a merger was pending but not disclosed.201 The price of the 
securities rose a great deal once the merger was announced.202 The 
taxpayer wished to claim a deduction for the high postannouncement 
 
 199.  The reasoning for this view as to gift taxation involves recourse to analogy from the law 
of estate taxation. Estate tax valuation authorities are generally applicable to income tax 
valuation for charitable contributions of property. See Anselmo v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 872, 881 
(1983), aff’d, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he test to be used for valuation for estate and 
gift tax purposes is generally the same as that used for charitable contribution deduction 
purposes.”); JOHN BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 2.03 (2021). This is particularly 
understandable, since the governing rules for estate and gift tax valuation are almost identical. 
Compare 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2 (2020) (giving the rules for gift tax valuation), with id. § 25.2512-
2 (2020) (giving the rules for estate tax valuation). Given the analogy, tax practitioners note the 
appropriateness of valuing stock gifts in light of an important Revenue Ruling directed toward 
the estate tax valuation of stock gifts, sold by the recipient within one year of a decedent’s death. 
Rev. Rul. 70-512, 1970-2 C.B. 192. This guidance requires executors to use the actual sale price—
rather than the midpoint method—to value the gift. Id. The reasoning is persuasive: “where the 
stock or bond is itself sold to the public in an arm’s length business transaction . . . the actual 
selling price is the best evidence of the fair market value per share or bond.” Id. The guidance 
further states that, when this is the case, “resort to the valuation formulae set out in section 
20.2031-2 [the midpoint calculation] of the regulations is neither necessary nor appropriate.” Id. 
Accordingly, when living donors give stock, which is promptly sold, it is plausible that the sale 
price is the best indicator of fair market value. See BOGDANSKI, supra note 199, ¶ 3.04. An IRS 
guidance document further elaborates on this point: 
Section 25.2512-2(e) provides, in relevant part, that in cases in which it is established 
that the value per bond or share of any security determined on the basis of the selling 
or bid and asked prices as provided under § 25.2512-2(b) does not represent the fair 
market value thereof, then some reasonable modification of the value determined on 
that basis or other relevant facts and elements of value shall be considered in 
determining fair market value.  
The value of property for Federal transfer tax purposes is a factual inquiry wherein the 
trier of fact must weigh all relevant evidence and draw appropriate inferences to arrive 
at the property’s fair market value. 
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 201939002 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
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price on the theory that the merger was already a certainty at the time 
the gift took place. The stock was already worth a lot, even if the 
midpoint price did not yet reflect it. The Advisory agreed with the 
taxpayer, reasoning that  
[t]he value of the property is the price at which such property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller . . . and both 
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. . . . Moreover, a 
hypothetical willing buyer is presumed to be “reasonably informed” 
and “prudent” and to have asked the hypothetical willing seller for 
information that is not publicly available.203 
Thus, the true price of the stock is what the buyers would have been 
willing to pay if they had asked the insider about the undisclosed 
merger and received an answer. 
Although that case was favorable to the taxpayer, its reasoning 
ought to apply equally in cases where it is not helpful to the taxpayer. 
If a willing buyer would pay very little for a security if apprised of the 
seller’s knowledge about the stock, then the value of the security is very 
low—regardless of what prices ignorant buyers and sellers currently 
accept in the trading market. On this reasoning, when a donor claims 
the apparent market price for a security, while knowing undisclosed 
information indicating that will surely depress the price once disclosed, 
the donor improperly deducts too much. Accordingly, insider gifts can 
constitute valuation fraud even if nothing is backdated and only the 
publicly reported price is claimed.  
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Having set out the rationales that might motivate manipulative 
gifts, the strategies donors might use to operationalize them, and the 
relevant legal constraints (or lack thereof), this Article now turns to 
the data. To what degree do large shareholders play manipulative 
games with their gifts? This Part presents evidence and analysis 
consistent with large shareholders frequently exploiting their access to 
corporate management to give the perfect gift, with plenty of 
backdating utilized as well. 
 
 203.  Id. (quoting Est. of Kollsman v. Comm’r, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172 (2017)). 
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A. The Data 
The insider trading data come from the Thomson Reuters Insider 
Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2020). Our sample includes U.S. common 
stocks. The time period is from January 1986 through December 2020. 
The final dataset has over 1,000 unique Committee on Uniform 
Securities Identification Procedures (“CUSIP”) numbers and over 
9,000 observations. Stock price, outstanding shares, and stock return 
information were obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (“CRSP”).204 CUSIP numbers, unique to each firm, were used 
to match insider trading data from the Thomson Reuters dataset to 
price and return information from the CRSP dataset. 
The Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the 
SEC Ownership Reporting System. The data contain all open market 
gifts by beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more than 10 
percent of any equity class of securities) of publicly traded firms. These 
insiders are identified with relation codes SH and B. To focus on large 
shareholders, we exclude all gifts by officers and directors, or any 
insider with both officer and large shareholder titles. Gifts are 
designated by the transaction code G. To ensure that insiders give gifts 
instead of receiving them, all observations with an 
acquisition/disposition code equal to A were eliminated. The final 
sample is limited to firms for which stock return data are available in 
CRSP. Hence, all gifts of private corporations’ stock are excluded. 
Finally, to deal with potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use 
cleansed data from Thomson Reuters.205  
The gift database also provides three dates associated with an 
insider gift. The transaction date is the date of gift giving, when an 
insider donates the shares. The report date is the date when an insider 
gift transaction is made public by the SEC. The signature date is when 
the reporting form is signed by the insider.206  
 
 204.  The CRSP database is a subscription-only database that comes with a subscription to 
the Wharton Research Database. See Wharton Research Data Services, WHARTON SCH. UNIV. OF 
PA., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu [https://perma.cc/E85T-TNDX]. 
 205.  Thomson Reuters uses various checks to ensure data quality and assigns codes based on 
its filters. We use only cleansing codes H “High Quality” and R “Passes all Reasonableness 
checks.”  
 206.  Not all three of these dates are recorded for every gift transaction. 
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B. Sample Characteristics 
Table 2 shows the sample characteristics of the dataset. The 
sample is large, comprehensive, and covers 1986 through 2020 
inclusive. It includes all gifts of their own firms’ shares by all large 
shareholders in all publicly listed firms. As shown in Table 2, the 
overall sample contains gifts by shareholders in 1,655 unique firms. The 
total number of gifts is 9,858. Given the comprehensive cross-sectional 
and time-series nature of the dataset, this Article’s conclusions apply 
to all gifts by large shareholders and are not sample-specific. 
Table 2 also shows that the average gift size is about 215,000 
shares. Gift size increases with the size of the firms. In small firms, the 
average gift size is about 150,000 shares, and in large firms, about 
580,000 shares. The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling 
about 2.1 billion shares. The average dollar value gifted per firm is 
about $30 million, while the total dollar value of the gifts is about $50 
billion.  
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics of Common Stock Gifts by Large 
Shareholders, 1986–2020 











Number of firms 1,244 295 116 1,655  
Number of gifts 6,891 1,806 1,161  9,858 
Average gift size 




Total gifts by 
shareholders 
(million shares) 
1,004.57 439.68  674.75   2,119.00  
Average dollar 
amount per firm 
(millions of dollars) 
11.1 39.3 208.70 29.98 
Total dollar amount 
(millions of dollars) 13,808.4 11,593.5 24,209.20 49,611.1 
 
C. Measurement of Abnormal Returns 
We compute abnormal returns by subtracting the return to the 
equally weighted index of New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), 
American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”), and NASDAQ stocks from the 
returns for the stocks gifted by insiders.207 This approach controls for 
market movements and implicitly assumes that average beta or risk 
exposure is one. Given that the sample contains over 1,000 firms, this 
assumption is satisfied. Hence, abnormal return ARi,t for stock i and 
 
 207.  Our approach here is the same as in Avci, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 12, at 1152–
53. Using as the benchmark the total return to the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the 
total return to the equally weighted market portfolio gives similar results. We prefer the equally 
weighted returns because most (about 75 percent) of the firms in our sample are small firms. and 
the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms is a better match for small 
firms. 
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day t is computed as 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅 − 𝑅  for each firm i and day t. 𝑅  is 
the simple daily return on the stock i gifted by insiders on day t. 𝑅  is 
the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks on day t. For each event date t, these returns are first 
averaged across all gifting firms i to compute average abnormal 
returns:  𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 1𝑛 𝐴𝑅  
 
The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event 
dates as  𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅  
 
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the 
behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates. 
D. Empirical Findings 
We now examine the evidence regarding insiders’ behavior 
around gift-giving days. Figure 1 shows the pattern of abnormal returns 
for the overall sample period from one year before (250 trading days) 
to one year after the gift-giving date. Figure 1 suggests that the large 
shareholders are either lucky, or they engage in timing games around 
their gift giving. Stock prices rise about 6 percent abnormally relative 
to the market index during the one year before executives gift their 
stock. Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted stocks rose 6 
percent more than the market. If the overall market was down, the 
gifted stocks fell 6 percent less than the market during this period. 
Following the gifting date, stock prices fell abnormally by about 4 
percent relative to the overall stock market. The average maximum 
stock price occurs near the day of the gift.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days 
 
 
The conclusion from Figure 1 is that large shareholders were able 
to avoid up to a 4 percent decline in the value of their gifts by acting 
when they did rather than any time during the year before or after. 
Hence, by carefully timing their gifts, large shareholders are able to 
increase the size of their gifts on average by 4 percent.208 Furthermore, 
for their donations to tax-sheltered institutions, large shareholders are 
able to take 4 percent larger tax deductions as well.209 These large, 
abnormal returns cry out for an explanation. We consider several such 
explanations below.  
One possible explanation for the abnormal returns is that 
shareholders may be very lucky in finding the highest stock price for 
their gift giving. This could be nothing more than chance. To test this 
hypothesis, we examine the statistical significance of the rising prices 
followed by falling prices. We can reject that hypothesis at the 1 
percent significance level, once the return horizon reaches 20 days or 
beyond. Although chance can never be ruled out entirely, the patterns 
in Figure 1 suggest more than chance.  
 
 208.  It is likewise true that they increase the size of their gift by 3 percent relative to giving a 
year prior. Large shareholders are neither too early nor too late. 

































Days relative to gift date
Overall sample
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
668  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:619 
A second possibility is that large shareholders are, as a class, 
simply great at predicting future prices. Gifts would be just one facet 
of their general aptitude for transacting shrewdly. This second 
possibility can be rejected as at odds with the finance literature and our 
own data. The finance literature consistently shows no evidence that 
large stockholders generally possess material nonpublic information or 
that their trades otherwise outperform the market.210  
Our data reiterate that large shareholders generally are not 
especially skillful traders. We reinvestigate large shareholders’ 
abnormal profits when they engaged in open market sales and 
purchases from 1986 to 2020. This sample contains 417,309 open 
market transactions. This evidence is shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
 210.  See, e.g., Hollis A. Skaife, David Veenman & Daniel Wangerin, Internal Control Over 
Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider 
Trading, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 91, 93, 101 (2013); Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and 
Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 224, 233 (2009); Shijun Cheng, Venky Nagar & Madhav 
V. Rajan, Insider Trades and Private Information: The Special Case of Delayed-Disclosure Trades, 
20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1833, 1835, 1857 (2007); SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE, supra note 
11, at 73; H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. 
ECON. 189, 210 (1986); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS. 410, 
410–11 (1974).  
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Figure 1.1: Abnormal Returns Around Large Shareholders’ Open 
Market Sales and Purchases 
 
Consistent with the literature, we find that large shareholders’ 
open market sales and purchases indeed show little or no material 
nonpublic information. Large shareholders lose small amounts after 
they sell shares (prices rise slightly for about 10 months and fall only 
slightly after 10 months) and they lose again about 0.5 percent after 
they purchase shares (prices fall slightly).211 Once again, this evidence 
confirms that large shareholders do not typically utilize material 
nonpublic information when they trade in their own firms, which 
makes the stock price behavior around their gifts shown in Figure 1 
even more unusual. As a class, large shareholders do not appear to be 
skilled predictors of future prices, yet something is different about 
shareholders who make large gifts. Their giving has a prescience that is 
not present in ordinary trading, which is consistent with their belief that 
gifts are a safer way to exploit access to management or utilize 
backdating. These possibilities are considered next.  
 
 211.  The only evidence of information occurs within 10 days of their purchases when stock 
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E. Manipulative Explanations 
If abnormally good timing of gifts is not the product of luck or 
skill, it may be that large shareholders obtain and use inside 
information to time their gifts, pressure executives to reshuffle 
corporate disclosures, or backdate their gifts. All three possibilities are 
consistent with the abnormal returns depicted in Figure 1. However, 
further analysis lets us partially disaggregate the contribution of the 
various manipulative strategies. We are able to determine that 
backdating is not the major contributor to insiders’ apparent luck, 
though it remains an important tool for manipulative givers. Rather, 
most of the effect seems to come from access to management and from 
information leakage in particular.  
1. Access Is More Important Than Backdating.  All three 
manipulative strategies will result in donors giving away stock at higher 
prices than a randomly chosen moment for the gift. But they exhibit 
slightly different patterns in expressing their good results. Gifts 
associated with backdating should precede a decline in stock price but 
with a kink in the decline at the reporting date. A donor who decides 
on February 14 to make and report a gift can look back over a period 
of time and select an optimal date prior to February 14, but she cannot 
pick a date after February 14.212 By that point, the form will have been 
filed, and it will be too late to change. Thus, a February 14 filing that 
reports a gift on December 14 should predict lower prices between 
December 14 and February 14,213 but no prediction can be made about 
February 15 and onward. If backdating occurs, one can expect prices 
to fall sharply between the gift date and the reporting date, but 
beginning on the reporting date, they should resume a random walk. 
In other words, backdating predicts a sharp cliff in information content, 
with all of the abnormal returns located prior to the reporting date.  
By contrast, access strategies should present no kink where 
information content suddenly drops to zero. Recall that access means 
that the donor rushes a gift to precede a disappointing disclosure or 
urges a disclosure to be delayed to accommodate a gift. Either way, bad 
news should come after the gift and push down the price. But there 
 
 212.  We select this date because gifts can be reported within 45 days of the end of the fiscal 
year of the issuer. For an issuer whose calendar year is its fiscal year, February 14 would be the 
last day to file gifts in the preceding year.  
 213.  If, say, December 18 had a higher price than December 15, the donor would have 
selected December 18 as the purported gift date.  
VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  10:21 AM 
2021] INSIDER GIVING 671 
should not be any special cutoff date where that effect runs out. Some 
donors will donate the day before bad news comes out; others will give 
10 months before the bad news comes out. Perhaps the negative 
abnormal returns would lessen over time, but there should be nothing 
special about the reporting date. If a donor reports a February 15 gift 
on February 15, knowing bad news will be disclosed shortly, one should 
expect prices to fall after the reporting date. Thus, any abnormal 
returns observed after the reporting date may represent access 
strategies but likely not backdating.  
This evidence is shown in Figure 2. Although stock prices are 
relatively flat prior to the reporting date, they continue to decline 
sharply after the insider reporting date. In fact, stock prices decline 
abnormally by about 4.8 percent following the reporting date. (All 
abnormal returns 40 days after the reporting date attain statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level.) This evidence strongly suggests that 
most of the information content of gifts comes from access, whether 
through information leakage or the ability to influence the company’s 
disclosure dates. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that 
gift-giving large shareholders are different and much better connected 
to the executives of the firm than are large shareholders in general, 
because anyone can backdate, but not everyone has access to 
management.214  
 
 214.  It may seem that abnormal returns could have the non-nefarious explanation that 
individuals are simply more likely to give when stocks have increased in price; this could explain 
why prices rise before a gift. However, this explanation would not predict prices to fall subsequent 
to the gift. Insiders should not be able to identify “maximum” abnormal stock prices by simply 
conditioning their giving on prior positive stock returns. The fact that insiders do identify the peak 
price, and prices fall after the gift, suggests some degree of access to management. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Large 
Shareholders’ Gifts, Following the Reporting Date of Gifts 
2. Information Leakage to Shareholders Is Probably More 
Important Than Shareholders Influencing the Timing of Disclosures.  
The evidence shown in Figures 1 and 2 is consistent with both access 
strategies of executives leaking information to large shareholders or 
altering disclosure dates to suit shareholders. It is difficult to tell 
whether a gift was accelerated to precede bad news (gun-jumping) or 
bad news was delayed to follow a gift (bullet dodging), since one cannot 
observe the counterfactual. It is likewise difficult to tell whether a gift 
was delayed to follow good news (waiting game) or good news was 
delayed to follow a gift (bullet dodging). There is no record of when a 
gift or disclosure would otherwise have been made.  
Nevertheless, the data allow some insight into the nature of the 
access exploited, and that evidence tends to suggest that information 
leakage plays a more important role than influencing disclosure timing. 
As with the prior discussion comparing access to backdating, we first 
carefully consider the precise effects of these strategies and then test 
for the presence or absence of those effects. Although both access 
strategies lead to well-timed gifts, they do so in subtly different ways. 
Crucially, gun-jumping has a distinctive effect not matched by any of 
the other strategies: it is associated with normal returns before the gift 
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and negative abnormal returns after the gift. To see this, consider the 
effects each strategy should have on abnormal returns.  
Where an informed donor delays a gift to follow disclosure of good 
news (waiting game), one should expect positive abnormal returns in 
the pre-gift period. If there is a gift, it is likely that good news was just 
disclosed. However, there should be no positive or negative abnormal 
returns in the postgift period; having had a good month does not ensure 
or prevent the occurrence of bad news.  
The same effect is predicted where good news is rushed forward 
to increase the value of a gift planned to follow (spring loading). There, 
one should expect positive abnormal returns in the pregift period. If 
there is a gift, there is a good chance that good news was just disclosed, 
but the postgift period should not be uncommonly fortunate or 
unfortunate.  
Where an informed donor rushes a gift forward to precede bad 
news (gun-jumping), to which she is privy, no predictions can be made 
about the pregift abnormal returns: bad news arises after good months 
and bad months alike. But one can confidently predict the postgift 
period—it will experience negative abnormal returns, because bad 
news is going to be disclosed.  
Finally, when bad news is delayed so that a planned gift can be 
made at a better price (bullet dodging), two effects should follow. First, 
the decision to quash bad news for a while should make for an 
unusually cheery period prior to the gift, and so pregift abnormal 
returns should be positive. Then, reality will set in when the delayed 
bad news is finally disclosed. Sometime after the gift, the deferred 
disclosures will be made, and abnormal returns should turn negative. 
Thus, delaying bad news has two predicted effects, rather than one. 
Table 3 summarizes these predictions.  
Table 3: Predicted Abnormal Returns 
Accelerate Gift (gun-jumping) Negative postgift 
Delay Gift (waiting game) Positive pregift 
Accelerate Disclosure (spring 
loading) 
Positive pregift  
Delay Disclosure (bullet dodging) 
Positive pregift and negative 
postgift  
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With these effects in mind, we can then divide up our sample of 
firms with lucky donors to two sub-samples, based on their prior 30-
day abnormal price movements. If abnormal returns are positive in the 
month prior to a gift, the price is labeled “up.” If 30-day abnormal 
returns are negative, that price is labeled “down.” This subdivision 
isolates the various forces leading to different outcomes.  
Firms in the “up” subsample are more likely to have been subject 
to bullet dodging and springloading than firms in the “down” 
subsample. That is because both bullet dodging and springloading push 
up positive abnormal returns in the pregift period. Firms in the “down” 
sample are thus, on average, subject to less of both forms of disclosure 
influence. But if they are subject to less bullet dodging, they should 
exhibit less pronounced postgift negative abnormal returns. That is 
because bullet dodging is the only influence strategy that produces 
negative abnormal returns. If the “down” sample exhibits postgift 
negative abnormal returns on par with the “up” sample, it will be an 
indication that some amount of information leakage is occurring. Gun-
jumping, which means accelerating a gift to precede bad news, is 
capable of producing postgift negative abnormal returns even when 
pregift returns are not significantly positive. Put another way, two 
strategies produce negative postgift abnormal returns, one based on 
information and the other based on disclosure influence. The “down” 
group is subject to relatively less disclosure influence than the “up” 
group. Thus, if the “down” group displays comparable postgift 
declines, it will indicate that information strategies must loom large.  
Even most generally, if pregift returns predict postgift returns, it 
will tend to confirm that influence strategies are being used because 
influence strategies inherently affect both pre- and postgift returns. If 
there is no predictive effect, and postgift returns bear no special 
relationship to pregift returns, it will rule out influence as the exclusive 
channel of manipulative giving for the same reason. These findings are 
shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days, By Prior 30-Day 
Stock Price Movements 
 
Figure 3 shows that prior price moves do not affect or explain the 
general patterns of postgift day abnormal price movements. When 
prices rise abnormally during the 30 days prior to the gift giving date, 
prices still fall by 4.3 percent abnormally during the postgift period. 
When prices fall during the 30 days prior to the gift giving date, prices 
continue to fall by an additional 3.7 percent abnormally during the 
postgift period. The difference between “up” and “down” groups is not 
statistically significant. These results suggest that influence is not of 
primary importance. The “up” firms’ pregift positive abnormal returns 
would suggest more influence, but their approximately equal negative 
abnormal returns after the gift are at odds with that prediction.  
Recall that bullet dodging should be less common among the 
“down” firms than the “up” firms. For that reason, greater price 
declines among the “up” firms should be expected. But in fact, we find 
the opposite. That positive prior abnormal returns are followed by 
smaller postgift giving negative returns is also inconsistent with bullet 
dodging as the main explanation.215  
 
 215.  We can likewise strenuously reject the notion that spring loading, which means 
accelerating good news, is the primary mechanism for manipulative giving, since spring loading 
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The net result is that information leakage seems to play a vital role 
in explaining the apparent good luck of large shareholder donors. 
Influence over disclosure schedules may or may not also play an 
important role. 
3. The Nature of Backdating.  Although the data suggest that 
information leakage predominates over backdating, they are still 
consistent with backdating having a substantial effect. Accordingly, 
further investigation of that manipulative strategy is warranted.  
The backdating hypothesis suggests that holding all else constant, 
if large shareholders backdate their gifts, then these gifts will 
necessarily appear to be reported with delays, even if in reality they are 
reported as soon as they are given. This is because when shareholders 
backdate their gifts, they are designating a date earlier than the actual 
date for reporting purposes in order to take advantage of a higher stock 
price earlier in time for the charitable deduction. Lengthier reporting 
delays give shareholders the ability to search further back in time for 
the date with a higher stock price for reporting purposes. Backdating 
should lead to an inverse-V-pattern, with prices lower on the days both 
before and after the gift, and this inverse-V should be more 
pronounced with a greater reporting delay, since it lets the donor select 
the tallest mountain to climb. 
These implications are tested next. The evidence is shown in 
Figure 4, and it is consistent with backdating. It indicates that there is 
a strong relation between reporting lags and the inverse-V-shaped 
stock price patterns. In the promptly reported group (two days or 
less),216 stock prices rise about 4.4 percent during the one year prior to 
the gift date, and they continue to rise by about 3.2 percent during the 
one year after gifting. Hence, there is no inverse-V-shape pattern for 
gifts reported immediately. For those gifts that are reported with 
between a three and 20-day delay, stock prices rise about 5 percent 
prior to the gift date, and they decline about 5 percent during the one 
year after gifting. Thus, there is an inverse-V-shape for this group. 
 
 216.  We treat a gift as “promptly” reported if it is simply reported within two days throughout 
the sample period. Prior to SOX, legally promptly reported stock sales had to be within 10 days 
of the month following the trade date. Post-SOX, all sales must be reported within two business 
days to be considered legally prompt. By characterizing a gift as “late or nonprompt” we are not 
characterizing it as unlawfully late—given the lax reporting requirements for gifts, unlawfully late 
gifts should be rare indeed. Rather, we are assuming that the reporting norms for sales set a 
baseline of timeliness, and that it is noteworthy if a transaction departs from that baseline (even 
if subject to a lawful exemption). 
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Finally, Figure 4 also shows gifts that are reported with more than a 20-
day delay. For these gifts, stock prices rise about 6.5 percent prior to 
the gift date, and they decline about 5.5 percent during the one year 
after gifting. Hence, both the V-shape as well as postgift declines are 
most pronounced for gifts that are reported with the greatest delays. 
This evidence is consistent with backdating.  
Figure 4: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days, By Reporting 
Lags 
Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the backdating 
hypothesis. One caveat is that the stock option award backdating 
scandal broke around March 2006,217 and many companies and 
 
 217.  See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2006, 
11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114265075068802118 [https://perma.cc/37UB-NFVE]. 
Reporting at the time recounted the situation as follows:  
Suspecting such patterns aren’t due to chance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is examining whether some option grants carry favorable grant dates for 
a different reason: They were backdated. . . . The analysis bolsters recent academic 
work suggesting that backdating was widespread, particularly from the start of the tech-
stock boom in the 1990s through the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform act of 2002. If 
so, it was another way some executives enriched themselves during the boom at 
shareholders’ expense. And because options grants are long-lived, some executives 
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executives found themselves in litigation as a result.218 Consequently, 
we would not expect much gift backdating in the immediate aftermath 
of the scandal. To address this issue, we excluded the 10-year period 
from January 1, 2006 to January 1, 2016 to better gauge the incidence 
of potential backdating of gifts.219 This evidence is shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Giving Days, By 
Reporting Lags, Excludes 1/1/2006 to 1/1/2016 
 
Having set aside the period in which people would have been 
unusually reluctant to backdate, the evidence of backdating grows 
stronger. Once again, during this period, promptly reported gifts 
(reported within two days or less) do not exhibit any abnormal price 
patterns immediately around the gift-giving date. Prices also do not fall 
appreciably (especially in the first six months) following the gift date. 
For the middle group (between three and 20 days to report), prices rise 
abnormally during the one year prior to the gift date by 4.8 percent and 
 
 218.  See Spotlight on Stock Options Backdating, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
optionsbackdating.htm [https://perma.cc/P9E6-AM37] (compiling enforcement actions against 
companies related to options backdating). 
 219.  We have also experimented with excluding five-year periods starting on January 1, 2005 
and January 1, 2006 as well as a four-year period from January 1, 2006. These results are 
qualitatively the same, and they are not shown separately. In all cases, excluding the scandal 
period increases the information content of the gifts. 
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fall by 8.2 percent during the one year following the gift date. For the 
large delay group (more than 20 days to report), prices rise about 4.8 
percent during the one year prior to the gift date and fall by 7.5 percent 
during the one year following the gift date. Once again, the large delay 
group shows the greatest patterns consistent with backdating.  
We next examine the relation between gift size and abnormal 
price patterns.220 Backdating increases the relative size of a tax benefit, 
so it is more attractive when the gifts and corresponding tax deductions 
are already large. If insiders deliberately manipulate gift reporting, 
there should be a positive relation between gift size and abnormal price 
patterns, with steeper stock price declines following larger gifts. The 
evidence is shown in Figure 6. Consistent with the backdating theory, 
the largest gifts show the steepest declines after the gift date. 
Figure 6: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Giving Days, By Size 
 
For gifts less than $10,000, there is an inverse-V-shape and the 
stock prices decline abnormally about 4 percent during the one year 
after gifting. For gifts between $10,000 and $1 million, there is no 
inverse-V-pattern, and there is no postgift decline. Finally, for gifts 
 
 220.  By “gift size” we mean “dollar volume.” Dollar volume of the gift is measured as the 
product of the price and number of shares reported by the insiders. If a price is not reported or it 
is reported as zero, we used the last closing stock price prior to the gift month.  
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exceeding $1 million, there is a strong inverse-V-pattern. Stock prices 
rise more than 15 percent prior to the gift date, and they decline about 
9.1 percent during the one year after gifting. Hence, as expected, the 
strongest V-shape and the biggest decline occur in the largest gift size 
group. Larger effects for larger gifts are consistent with backdating.221  
IV. MANIPULATIVE GIVING POLICY 
The evidence shows that manipulative giving appears to be 
widespread, and manipulative givers are unlikely to be detected or 
punished, even if it is illegal. The next question is whether manipulative 
giving is good or bad. Despite the name, some may be tempted to 
defend manipulative giving. After all, it is giving. If some manipulative 
games are necessary to drive charitable contributions, so be it. 
Moreover, many of the problems with insider trading may seem 
inapplicable to insider giving: it is not like top executives will smuggle 
corporate secrets all day to large shareholders hungry to deplete their 
fortunes with altruism.  
This Part addresses the erroneous notion that gifts are inherently 
harmless. To the contrary, it often pays to be skeptical of strangers 
bearing gifts.222 Section A addresses tax policy on charitable giving, 
setting out tax law’s goals in permitting charitable deductions and how 
manipulative giving undermines it. Section B then turns to insider 
trading policy, reviewing the ways in which scholars have faulted 
insider trading and justified its regulation and showing how those same 
policy considerations apply to insider giving.  
A. Tax Policy 
It is natural to defend insider giving as giving. Whatever mischief 
insiders may be up to in pursuit of tax breaks, the tax breaks exist to 
encourage wealthy people to give to charities, a goal vindicated by the 
many thousands of stock gifts by insiders each year. But this 
misunderstands the policies at stake in charitable giving.  
The deduction for charitable giving is best viewed as a form of tax 
expenditure, which is to say a form of government spending 
 
 221.  That smaller dollar gifts also show some strategic timing suggests that insiders who are 
worried about regulatory implications might be breaking up their large gifts into smaller units. 
 222.  VIRGIL, AENEID II, at l. 49 (H.R. Fairclough trans., G.P. Goold rev., Harvard Press 
2001) (29–19 B.C.) (“equo ne credite, Teucri. quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis.” 
(“Men of Troy, trust not the horse. Whatever it be, I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts.”)).  
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administered through the tax code.223 Governments often style 
spending programs as mere tax reductions: for example, a tax credit for 
solar panels is effectively a government program that pays people to 
install solar panels. The goal of these programs is to alter private 
behavior. On this account, tax incentives are used to spur private 
donations to charities, because charities tend to serve the public 
welfare.224 One reason to encourage taxpayers to give to charities, 
rather than have the government give directly, is that taxpayers may 
sometimes give more wisely than governments.225 A second reason is 
governments may get more value for their dollar this way, as a small 
tax deduction may encourage large amounts of charitable giving.226 
 
 223.  The other theory is that charitable deductions are necessary to preserve the natural level 
of charitable giving, rather than letting it be dampened by the distortions of high income taxes. 
Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 263, 267–68 (2013) (explaining the “base-defining” account as “simply as a necessary 
adjustment to properly measure income . . . . Under this approach, the tax base is defined to 
exclude charitable giving expenses, which are seen as unlike other forms of private 
consumption”). Congress discussed such an argument in its report on the matter: 
The congressional intent behind the charitable deduction was to ensure taxpayers 
would have money available to support charities, despite the necessary tax increase to 
fund World War I . . . . “[T]he exemption from taxation of money or property devoted 
to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.” 
Kristin Balding Gutting, Relighting the Charitable Deduction: A Proposed Public Benefit 
Exception, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 453, 460–61 (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938), 
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 728, 742).  
 224.  E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and the Great Corporate 
Giveaway, 22 PAC. L.J. 221, 228–29 (1991). 
 225.  Professor David Schizer offers three separate rationales—all rooted in problems of 
information and incentives—for why we should pursue public goals with subsidized charity rather 
than other available policy instruments: “first, to encourage donors to be more generous; second, 
to measure and reflect popular preferences about which public goals to pursue; and third, to 
recruit private monitors.” David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, 
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 267 (2009); see also 
Linda Sugin, Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming Rights, Inequality, and Social Norms, 
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 124 (2018) (“[P]rivate funding of those public purposes relieves burdens on 
government, fosters socially beneficial experimentation, and challenges government 
orthodoxy.”). 
 226.  See Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 
ECONOMETRICA 1201, 1201 (1976); William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, 
and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 710 (1995); Laura Tiehen, Tax 
Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 707, 707 (2001) (estimating price 
and income elasticities of charitable giving); Brian Galle, How Do Nonprofit Firms Respond to 
Tax Policy?, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 364, 364 (2016); see also John List, The Market for Charitable 
Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS., 157, 173 (2011). List also finds empirical evidence for the notion that 
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Subsidizing charity through deductions presents a tradeoff: 
“When policymakers consider giving tax breaks for charitable gifts, 
they are at least implicitly considering the issue of whether the 
marginal cost (foregone tax revenues) is less than the marginal benefit 
(increased dollars of giving).”227 An “equitable statutory scheme” for 
charitable contributions “encourages charitable giving but prevents tax 
abuse.”228 Generally, “as the charitable deduction is constructed, the 
government should not lose more revenue than a maximum percentage 
(currently somewhere between thirty and forty-five percent) of the 
amount that actually benefits a charity.”229 
 
matching gifts increases the amount of charitable donations in the first place. See generally Dean 
Karlan & John List, Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural 
Field Experiment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1174 (2007) (finding “that simply announcing that match 
money is available considerably increases the revenue per solicitation—by 19 percent”); Stephan 
Meier & Bruno S. Frey, Matching Donations: Subsidizing Charitable Giving in a Field Experiment 
(U. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 181, 2004) (finding that “matching donations increases the 
contributions to a public good,” but “the effect depends . . . on the amount of the matching 
mechanism”). Interestingly, one study found that matching contributions produced significantly 
larger contributions than rebate mechanisms. See Catherine Eckel & Philip Grossman, Rebate 
Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 
681, 681 (2003); see also Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions 
Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX L. 331, 360 (2015); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of 
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction 
of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 89 (1994) (“The tax expenditure theory identifies this lost 
revenue as an indirect federal subsidy to the charitable recipient administered through the 
Internal Revenue Code. Since 1974 tax expenditures have been reflected in the federal budget.”); 
Arthur C. Brooks, Income Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, 26 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 599, 
599 (2007) (“Favorable income tax treatment of charitable contributions comes from the policy 
assumption that this will create an incentive to support what is arguably a public good or service, 
or at least curtail the disincentive to give created by the income tax’s impact on disposable 
income.”). On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues argue that transitory 
income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior—what matters are the persistent 
tax and income effects. Since tax policies have long-lasting effects on company income levels, they 
are the most important elements determining the amount and timing of donations. Entities adjust 
donations  based on tax regulation more often than on income shocks. See Gerald E. Auten, 
Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel 
Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 372 (2002) (discussing empirical data on charitable giving with 
special emphasis on the effects of taxes). 
 227.  List, supra note 226, at 170. 
 228.  Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and 
a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (2002); see also Colinvaux, supra note 223, at 
264 (“[T]he broader policy for all charitable contributions should be . . . to encourage (or at least 
not tax) gifts of measurable benefit to charitable organizations.”). 
 229.  Gerzog, supra note 51, at 1179; see also Colinvaux, supra note 223, at 273 (citing S. REP. 
NO. 91-552, at 80–81 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2109–10).  
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As a whole, the policy rationale for charitable gift deductions is to 
encourage taxpayers to give much more than the fiscal losses 
(otherwise, the government could give to the charity directly) and to 
encourage taxpayers to use their private information to select and 
monitor reputable charities. Manipulative gifts generally frustrate 
these goals and, therefore, undermine sound policy.  
In several variations of insider giving, insiders take a tax deduction 
that exceeds the value of the gift they give. Taxpayers who backdate 
gifts always claim a higher tax valuation than the charity actually 
received. Taxpayers who give just before bad news is disclosed are like 
those who deduct a high value for a donated car despite knowing the 
doors will soon come unglued and fall off. We observed in the 
hypothetical variations of the case study of JetBlue, discussed above, 
that this strategy can sometimes leave the donor wealthier than if she 
never made a gift. It is bad tax policy for a taxpayer to give $1,000 to a 
charity but receive more than $1,000 in tax benefits for so doing. This 
is simply a form of valuation abuse.230  
In other variations of the scheme, the charity receives an amount 
equal to what the donor gave. That is when (1) the donor instructs the 
charity to promptly sell, before bad news is disclosed, or (2) when a 
preplanned gift is delayed after a favorable disclosure. These variants 
only weakly frustrate tax policy: by encouraging taxpayers to wait to 
give gifts, charities face longer periods before gifts are given. The first 
offends no tax principles, though both pose problems under insider 
trading policy, as the next Section explains.  
B. Insider Trading and Giving Policy  
An extensive literature discusses insider trading’s morality and 
efficiency. Examining the various policy rationales reveals that they 
operate substantially similarly for insider giving. Broadly speaking, 
critics of insider trading (and thus, defenders of its legal prohibition) 
identify three classes of harms implicated by insider trading: (1) harms 
to the corporate issuer, whose information is used for trades; (2) harms 
to retail traders and investors who lack inside information; and (3) 
harms to the market. Each policy consideration is hotly contested, and 
this Article does not purport to settle those debates—only to note the 
plausible harms frequently alleged and their applicability to insider 
gifts.  
 
 230.  Supra Part I.B. 
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1. Harms to the Corporate Issuer.  Scholars expect several 
problems when insider trading is permitted at a corporation. First, 
trading may distract employees by diverting their attention to trading 
opportunities rather than business opportunities.231 These employees 
might cause the corporation to take excessively risky actions. Each 
surprising success or failure gives the employee a chance to trade 
before the results of their actions are made public.232 Indeed, executives 
might affirmatively sabotage business results, so that they can sell stock 
shortly ahead of the unexpectedly bad results.233 They also might 
manipulate disclosures, delaying or accelerating them to correspond to 
their trading strategies.234  
Moreover, the act of trading might lead to disclosure of an 
employer’s proprietary secrets.235 For example, in the fall of 1963, 
Texas Gulf Sulphur found “[t]he biggest ore strike since gold was 
discovered” in Timmins, Ontario.236 Keeping the discovery secret for 
 
 231.  James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago 
School”, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 646.  
 232.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: 
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (“[T]he temptation of 
profit might actually encourage an insider to act against the corporation’s interest.”). But see 
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 
874–76 (1983) (arguing that risk-averse managers need such incentives, and their team dynamics 
limit how far things can go without a leak).  
 233.  This is the counterpoint to Manne’s idea that insider trading was a prudent way to 
compensate employees for causing hard-to-compensate improvements in the business. HENRY G. 
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138 (1966). 
 234.  See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the 
Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054–55 (1982) (“Subordinates would stall the upward 
flow of critical information to maximize their opportunities for financial gain.”); Roy A. 
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. 
L. REV. 1425, 1437 (1967); cf. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with 
Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425 n.18 (2000) (“The prospect of insider 
trading profits can . . . encourage insiders to invest in projects that are difficult for outsiders to 
assess, whether these projects are otherwise desirable or not, in order to increase the information 
asymmetry between themselves and public shareholders . . . .”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Insider Trading, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772, 787–88 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (arguing that delay is unlikely).  
 235.  See James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider Trading Through Texas 
Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 707 (2018). For example, when mining executives buy their 
company’s shares en masse, it may hint to other prospectors where they should dig to find 
valuable minerals. Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities, 107 VA. L. REV. 447, 490–
91 (2016). 
 236.  SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843, 878 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).  
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years, “Texas Gulf did what any prudent mining company would have 
done to acquire property in which it knew a very promising anomaly 
lay.”237 But the secret would not be kept. Texas Gulf insiders bought 
their company’s stock to such a degree that it attracted media 
attention.238 Texas Gulf Sulphur was forced to prematurely admit to its 
discovery,239 giving landowners the chance to charge more and 
competitors the chance to bid for morsels of the hoard. 
Just as insider trading may tip off competitors to the detriment of 
the corporation, the same leakage can occur if insiders share 
information with friends and patrons. In Texas Gulf Sulphur’s case, 
corporate insiders were not the only ones who bought stock on the 
basis of the mineral find—many of the insiders’ friends and family (and 
then their friends and family) bought stock in a daisy chain of 
sharing.240 Even if the Texas Gulf fiduciaries had never traded, tips to 
outsiders could have resulted in the same telltale trading that hinted at 
a bonanza. Worse yet, the tips themselves (“We have found gold in 
Timmins”) could somehow find their way to a competitor, who would 
then have no need to decode the price signal.  
The Corporate Director’s Guidebook explains a third harm risked 
by insider trading, beginning with the risk from tipping to third parties: 
“[U]nauthorized disclosure of nonpublic information by directors can 
damage the bond of trust between and among directors and 
management, discourage candid discussions, and jeopardize 
boardroom effectiveness and director collaboration.”241 The 
Guidebook correctly notes that directors may be less trusting and open 
if they suspect that some members are squirreling away information for 
friends and family. Directors who are more concerned with protecting 
the corporation may attempt to exclude the less faithful ones from 
information, creating a distrustful and hostile atmosphere unconducive 
to collegial, strategic planning. Presumably, that effect would be only 
 
 237.  Alan M. Weinberger, Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur Rules at Fifty, 45 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 23, 29 (2017) (quoting Leitch GoldMines, Ltd. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., [1969] 1 O.R. 469 
(Can. Ont. 1969)). See generally MORTON SHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL (1969) 
(describing U.S. litigation concerning land purchases settled out of court).  
 238.  See Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 846–47.  
 239.  Id.  
 240.  See Keith Bishop & Allen Matkins, A Hollow Nickel, Hollywood And Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, JD SUPRA (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-hollow-nickel-
hollywood-and-texas-77851 [https://perma.cc/BG5A-3BBR] (describing how a paperboy bought 
stock on a tip regarding the bonanza). 
 241.  Corporate Director’s Guidebook, supra note 108, at 1500.  
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stronger if directors were themselves suspected of opportunistic 
trading.  
Those who worry that executives will behave badly if tempted to 
trade (or support someone else’s trading) should worry about insider 
giving as well. Insider trading enriches insiders when the business 
prospers and protects them when it falters. This provides a perverse 
incentive to increase volatility, but at least there is some upside for 
shareholders in the good times: the insider gains strong incentives to 
increase the corporation’s value. Although most scholars regard 
insider trading as providing bad incentives on balance, some prominent 
contrarians fixate on the energy with which insiders may pursue good 
outcomes that they can trade on.242  
Insider giving provides similar, but arguably worse, incentives 
because it does little to encourage good outcomes. The insider can 
discreetly dispose of stock by gift when problems arise, but there is no 
way to get rich from a great increase in value. Insider giving therefore 
functions like a put option.243 If things work out badly, the executive 
claims a large deduction rather than going down with the ship. Thus, 
the insider becomes indifferent to terrible outcomes without becoming 
especially interested in good outcomes. This encourages a strategy of 
picking up pennies in front of a steam roller. This is not a good 
incentive. 
Indeed, the special worry that insiders may manipulate disclosures 
to facilitate more advantageous transactions seems especially 
worrisome for insider giving. Precisely when it is most important for a 
corporation to be forthright, insider giving provides a reason for 
management to hold back the truth. Yet, the longer information is 
withheld, the harder it is for a troubled business to course correct. 
Recall that a hypothetical delay in JetBlue’s disclosures could help 
large shareholders maximize their gifts, but it also would increase the 
number of ticket sales that would need to be renegotiated with 
customers.244  
 
 242.  See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 233, at 55. 
 243.  Anne Sraders, What Is a Put Option? Examples and How To Trade Them in 2019, 
THESTREET (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/options/what-is-a-put-
option-14826777 [https://perma.cc/2F5W-WM2M] (“A put option is a contract that allows an 
investor the right but not the obligation to sell shares of an underlying security at a certain price 
at a certain time.”). A put option pays nothing when stock prices rise and a positive amount when 
stock prices fall sufficiently. Id. It protects an investor against declines in value. 
 244.  Supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
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Nor is the disclosure problem always in favor of insufficient 
disclosure. Insiders who plan to dispose of stock, whether by gift or 
sale, prefer early disclosures of positive corporate information. This 
Article demonstrates how a large shareholder would have enjoyed 
greater tax benefits if JetBlue disclosed information earlier. But early 
disclosure might benefit competitors. Executives have a duty to time 
disclosures in the best interests of the company, subject to federal 
securities mandates. Insider giving, like insider trading, gives them a 
reason to push for other times—even if it harms the corporation and 
most of its investors. 
2. Harms to Market Quality.  Trading markets make at least two 
important contributions.245 First, liquidity means the ability to quickly 
and cheaply sell or buy an asset. If trading markets are liquid, investors 
can save for retirement and obtain appropriate diversification. Risky 
young businesses will also find it easier to raise capital if their early 
investors know that it will later be easy to liquidate their investment. 
Second, price accuracy means that the publicly observed trading prices 
of assets bear a strong relationship to their real value,246 rather than 
arising from manipulation and bubbles. Accurate prices let observers 
make better decisions, such as how to invest or redeploy resources in 
the economy.247 Much of insider trading law is focused on improving 
price accuracy without unduly harming liquidity.  
Insider trading bears a complex relationship with price accuracy. 
On the one hand, traders who know material nonpublic information 
can improve the accuracy of asset prices by expressing their informed 
views through trading,248 and the possibility of trading profits 
 
 245.  Fox et al., supra note 23, at 833 (“How well the market functions can be described largely 
in terms of its two most important characteristics: price accuracy and liquidity.”).  
 246.  Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price 
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 342–44 (2003); 
see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (“The compliance effort is rationalized, to a significant degree, by one 
principal goal of securities laws: to create stock markets in which the market price of a stock 
corresponds to its fundamental value.”). 
 247.  Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: 
An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (1984); Kahan, supra note 246, at 1005–16. 
 248.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 629–34 (1984).  
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encourages them to acquire information.249 If insider trading were 
widespread, executives would trade, expressing their knowledge of the 
company; directors would tip corporate secrets to family and friends, 
who then express their knowledge through trading; and confidences 
would be forever violated, as spouses,250 psychiatrists,251 and Alcoholics 
Anonymous partners252 rush to launder their confidantes’ secrets. It 
might not be pretty, but it is hard to imagine a price bubble in such a 
climate.  
On the other hand, price accuracy is also endangered by insider 
trading. Executives may push to reduce the quality of public 
disclosures253 to multiply the opportunities for the insider to trade 
ahead of unexpected news.254 Some scholars argue that insider trading 
cannibalizes other forms of informed trading sufficiently that insider 
trading reduces price accuracy.255 Most of all, many forms of 
information are disclosed to the public as a result of federal securities 
laws—any gains from insider trading may only be small improvements 
in the speed of dissemination.  
Although there is debate about whether insider trading helps or 
hurts price accuracy overall, there is little doubt that it harms liquidity. 
Extensive informed trading can demoralize investors from entering a 
market at all.256 It can also raise the expected cost of trading. In many 
markets, rising trading costs are reflected in wider “bid-ask spreads,” 
 
 249.  Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006). 
 250.  See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 251.  See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 252.  See United States v. McGee, 955 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d, 763 F.3d 304 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
 253.  See supra note 233.  
 254.  See supra note 232.  
 255.  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 711; see also Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider 
Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical 
Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 276 (2007) (showing that stock prices are 
“presumably more informative” in countries with insider trading restrictions); Michael J. Fishman 
& Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 
106, 110 (1992) (“[S]ome market professionals are deterred by insider trading. If a sufficient 
number are deterred, the share price is less efficient.”).  
 256.  This is one of the motivating ideas behind some insider trading-related legislation. H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-910, at 7–8 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (“[T]he small 
investor will be—and has been—reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged against 
him.”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to 
venture their capital in a market where [insider trading] is unchecked by law.”).  
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which are the implied commissions charged by market intermediaries 
called market makers.257 Market makers set those spreads in part based 
on their costs.258 Their costs include expected trading losses.259 Every 
time the market maker buys stock that goes down in price, the market 
maker loses money. The odds of making a loss are to some degree 
matched by the lucky gains where the market maker buys just before 
the price rises. But when many traders are informed, the odds are 
unbalanced. More often than not, market makers will be buying from 
insiders who know the stock will soon fall and who would not be selling 
if it were due to rise. Extensive theoretical and empirical evidence 
supports the idea that traders with inside information—those very 
traders whose trades may improve price efficiency—drive up the cost 
of trading for everyone else.260  
Insider giving tends to harm the stock market in exactly the way 
that insider trading does. When stock is gifted, it does not reside with 
the recipient forever. A best practice for foundations is to promptly 
liquidate the gift to avoid expected trading losses,261 diversify their 
portfolio,262 and obtain the cash they need for their mission. Many of 
these sales will be prior to the bad news about the company becoming 
public. To the degree charities are bearers of bad stock, market makers 
will suffer expected losses in their dealings with them. The adverse 
 
 257.  Nabil Khoury, Stylianos Perrakis & Marko Savor, PIP Transactions, Price Improvement, 
Informed Trades and Order Execution Quality, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 211, 226 (2010) (finding that 
Boston Options Exchange market makers adopted positions matching those of informed traders); 
Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse 
Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 116 & nn.159–62 (2004).  
 258.  See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72 (1985). 
 259.  Id. at 84.  
 260.  See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 258, at 72–77; Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions 
and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1332 (1985); see also George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 
(1970) (discussing the liquidity of durable goods); Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 27 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12, 13–14 (1971) (discussing the role of market makers in providing liquidity); 
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property 
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1251 (2001) (“It is widely agreed that insider trading 
diminishes liquidity. This view is based on a theoretical model that suggests that market makers 
will offset the risk of trading against insiders by increasing the bid-ask spread.”); Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the 
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 467, 469–70 (2001) (discussing the mixed evidence on 
how insider trading affects liquidity). 
 261.  Salotti & Power, supra note 145, at 7 n.2. 
 262.  Moore & Higgins, supra note 143, at 161. 
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selection model does not require the charity to know that it is passing 
off troubled securities any more than the recipient of counterfeit 
money must know they are spending fakes. The injury is done in that 
the price-setting market intermediaries end up with assets they regret 
buying. Because charities tend to promptly resell the stock they get, 
insider giving has essentially the same market-injuring consequences 
as insider selling.  
3. Protecting Individual Traders.  The most intuitive rationale for 
insider trading laws is the injury or unfairness to individual investors 
who trade in a pool of sharks. The individual who sells to an insider 
before the price rises misses out, just as one who buys from an insider 
before the stock drops will regret the purchase.263 The counterparty’s 
loss in dealings with the insider may have the flavor of unfairness,264 
fiduciary abuse,265 or theft.266 Similar unfairness arises when a charity 
receives a gift under the same circumstances and sells it to an 
unsuspecting investor. The uninformed buyer will regret buying. They 
will rue the day they crossed paths (albeit anonymously) with a charity 
that knew or should have known the importance of selling 
immediately. As a current or future shareholder of the traded 
company, the buyer would be right to think that they have been 
mistreated by the executives who facilitated the insider gift; corporate 
information is not swag for the CEO to dole out to especially favored 
shareholders. Insofar as manipulative giving begins with executives 
misusing the information with which they were entrusted, the 
corporation’s residual claimants may not care if the misuse was by 
trading or by helping others to trade.  
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Widespread manipulative giving is problematic and surprising. 
This Part considers the policy implications for reform and the 
 
 263.  William K. S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies-
Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 
27, 31–35 (2007). 
 264.  Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 375, 376–77, 381 (1999); Levmore, supra note 232, at 119, 124, 125.  
 265.  See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2009). 
 266.  Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 30 (1984); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the 
Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 94 (1987). 
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conceptual implications for what insider gifts teach us about corporate 
law and securities markets. The first Section considers reform 
strategies that can preserve a culture of philanthropy without straining 
the U.S. tax or trading system. It recommends removing tax rules that 
bias donors in favor of stock rather than cash and securities rules that 
exempt gifts from protective restrictions and disclosure. Then, Section 
B notes what must be true about the world for insider giving to be 
common: large shareholders must be more powerful and connected 
than previously assumed. This partially undermines any dichotomy 
between controlling shareholders and the rest. In fact, there appears to 
be a continuous spectrum of influence from the largest shareholders on 
down.  
A. Reform 
This Section considers reforms that could reduce the incidence 
and injury of manipulative gifts. Some solutions are commonsense and 
deserve immediate consideration. Others are plausible but force hard 
choices. 
1. Equating Gifts and Sales.  Although insider gifts are subject to 
numerous legal restrictions, several areas of securities law nevertheless 
at least plausibly exempt gifts from requirements applicable to sales. 
The reason is partially about policy, with the SEC believing that gifts 
“present less likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”267 It is also drawn 
from the platonic ideal of what a gift is: “a gift to charity or indeed to 
anyone else when made in good faith and without pretense or 
subterfuge [cannot] be considered a sale or anything in the nature of a 
sale. It is the very antithesis of a sale . . . .”268 However, if gifts are timed 
using insider information or backdating, there is a benefit to the 
insiders, which undermines the basis for their exemption. This Article’s 
findings challenge the raison d’etre of the regulatory exemptions for 
 
 267.  Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, supra 
note 21.  
 268.  Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see also Shaw v. Dreyfus, 
172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that bona fide gifts cannot be considered sales); Lewis v. 
Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (differentiating between the sale of stock options 
and gift of stocks to charities).  
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gifts. In many cases, gifts should be subject to the same or similar 
treatment as sales.269 
The clearest example is in the delayed reporting permitted to gifts. 
While sales must be reported on Form 4 within two days, gifts may be 
reported many months later—by 45 days after the end of the issuer’s 
fiscal year—on Form 5. Yet this Article showed that delayed reporting 
is likely associated with backdating. Allowing gift givers to select across 
a 13.5 month period for the most advantageous price is simply too great 
a temptation for backdating. The SEC should promulgate guidance 
that gifts are subject to the same reporting requirement as sales.270  
Likewise, several securities prohibitions on insider trading ought 
to be extended to cover both sales and gifts. While there is a reasonable 
argument that 10b-5 and Regulation FD already prevent insider giving, 
the law should be clear. In general, such a reform would be best 
handled by an SEC rule, given the SEC’s ample statutory authority to 
support such a change.271 However, in some instances it is possible for 
individual courts to take the lead. It is courts, after all, that created the 
implication that gifts might not be sales for these purposes.272  
One might argue that prosecutions for insider giving would tend 
to chill gifts of stock, thus harming charities, but the risk is low. Any 
time it is lawful for executives to sell their stock, they could lawfully 
 
 269.  Although this leveling up proposal urges equivalent treatment under the law, the same 
would be true as further reforms are considered. For example, Josh Mitts argues that insiders 
should be required to disgorge gains made from sale at ephemeral prices – a sort of extension of 
16(b). Joshua Mitts, Insider Trading and Strategic Disclosure 17 (Colum. L. Sch. Ctr. for L. & 
Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 636, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3741464 [https://perma.cc/ 
8BGQ-954W]. If enacted, similar considerations should bear on gifts at ephemeral prices. 
 270.  If it is necessary to soften such an intervention, there are a number of options that would 
still do a lot of good. For example, prompt reporting could be generally required except for small 
gifts—an exemption for purchases less than $10,000 is already in place. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a–
6(a)(1) (2020). Small purchases can be part of an abusive scheme, but small purchases are less 
problematic than large ones, as we have already documented that analogously large gifts are more 
problematic than small ones. Alternatively, one could impose moderate reporting windows—say, 
five days—for most gifts and reserve two-day reporting for the most suspicious gifts, such as those 
to charities controlled by the donor.  
 271.  Supra Part II.  
 272.  See, e.g., Truncale, 80 F. Supp. at 391; see also Shaw, 172 F.2d at 142 (“Certainly bona 
fide gifts, as these were conceded to be, are not within the accepted meaning of ‘sales’; nor do 
they involve ‘any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of’ the property given.”); Lewis, 331 F. 
Supp. at 1268 (“A reexamination of 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10, however, indicates that it incorporates 
the provisions of 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-9 only ‘in so far as [the transaction] is otherwise subject to 
the provisions of section 16(b),’ [Previous cases] have determined that a bona fide gift is not 
subject to the provisions of § 16(b) of the Act.”). 
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donate it. The 10b5-1(c) trading plans that allow for periodic sales of 
stock could allow gifts as well. Moreover, many users of manipulative 
giving strategies may still be inclined to give because of the altruistic, 
reputational, and tax benefits. They will simply arrange their affairs 
less aggressively to capture unwarranted tax benefits. It is even possible 
that limiting manipulative gifts will increase giving. The prestige of 
giving gifts depends on them not becoming associated with abusive 
conduct; if newspapers continue to identify suspicious gifts, innocent 
donors may seek to distance themselves from tarnished practices.273 
Finally, any possible reduction of gifts due to reform, if deemed 
problematic, could be offset by increased government support for 
charities or subsidies for gifts. Recall that manipulative givers are 
generally reducing their tax burden by a disproportionate amount. 
Cutting down on unwarranted deductions saves the fisc money. If 
desired, that money can be immediately redeployed with targeted 
funding to charitable causes or increased tax credits for donors. There 
is no reason that reform must lead to a net reduction in government 
support for charitable causes. Reform only means that government 
expenditures for supporting charities will no longer disproportionately 
flow to those willing to commit fraud or abuse positions of trust.  
2. Equating Cash and Stock.  Outside of corporate and securities 
law, much mischief could be avoided if the tax code simply did not 
encourage gifts of stock to charities.274 A primary reason that stocks 
serve as manipulative gifts is that there are legitimate nonmanipulative 
reasons to give stock. Donors can avoid taxes on appreciation by giving 
appreciated property, rather than selling it prior to the gift.  
The tax code could be amended to eliminate this reason to give 
property. The simplest way would be to treat a gift as a realization 
event—then the donor would pay taxes on capital gains at the time of 
 
 273.  Institutions often decline gifts from problematic donors in order to preserve reputational 
capital. When they accept tarnished gifts, they apologize. Cf., e.g., Joi Ito, My Apology Regarding 
Jeffrey Epstein, MIT MEDIA LAB (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.media.mit.edu/posts/my-apology-
regarding-jeffrey-epstein [https://perma.cc/2BFK-FC53] (providing a prominent example of such 
an apology). Presumably, one reason for this is to encourage other donors to continue to give. 
 274.  In this view, we join with most tax scholars who disapprove of the distortions currently 
favoring gifts of property. See, e.g., Gerzog, supra note 51, at 1159; Colinvaux, supra note 223, at 
292; Knauer, supra note 226, at 91. 
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the gift.275 There would no longer be an advantage to giving gifts of 
stock rather than cash. Gifts of stock might sometimes still occur. But 
with one important legitimate reason to give stock eliminated, such 
gifts would be rarer and more suspicious. Government officials may be 
able to more quickly and confidently investigate the timing of the gift 
to determine whether manipulation may be in play.276  
3. Mandatory (or Forbidden) Holding.  One solution to the 
problem of overvalued gifts is to require charities to immediately 
liquidate any gifted securities. With this solution, there is certainty, for 
example, that an executive who deducts $92 million for a gift of stock 
really enriched the charity by $92 million. This would also expose and 
eliminate fictitious pricing from backdating.  
But a mandatory, prompt sale may raise other issues. A charity 
that attempts to sell a large stake into an illiquid market may cause the 
price to fall, depleting the contribution and creating the false 
impression of a misdeed. There should be leeway to allow the charity 
to sell the shares in an orderly fashion. More importantly, securities 
law’s policy of supporting low trading costs and equal treatment of 
investors is undermined if the donor and charity collectively deposit 
toxic stock in the market.277  
Since securities policy is harmed by prompt sale, perhaps the 
opposite reform should be considered. Mandatory holding by the 
charity would support securities policy, at the cost of tax policy: the 
charity is likely to hold the stock during the decline in value, creating a 
wedge between the tax deduction value and the realized value to the 
recipient. It also forces the charity to operate without cash it may need 
and to bear idiosyncratic risk (that is, that the stock might decline for 
reasons having nothing to do with inside information). Finally, longer 
holding periods exacerbate and further hide fictitious pricing arising 
from backdating. 
So, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between tax and securities 
policy. Either choice may be appropriate if other reforms can minimize 
 
 275.  Donors can also claim a large tax deduction at the time of the gift, even if the securities 
are most profitably sold over a longer time horizon. This provides an independent reason to 
donate property, but it is unlikely to be highly significant for gifts of liquid securities.  
 276. Another possibility is for Congress or the regulators to consider fixing the donations 
period so that it is not a single moment in time and to require the stock valuation, for purposes of 
the deduction, to be computed as the average trading price over a period of time. The details of 
such a proposal exceed the scope of this Article. 
 277.  Supra Part IV.B.2.  
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the downsides associated with the choice. If prompt sale is 
accompanied by vigorous detection and prosecution of gifts based on 
material nonpublic information, then prompt sale can be safely 
required. If mandatory holding is accompanied by timely reporting 
requirements to combat backdating, mandatory holding may be 
superior. 
This Section has addressed how our empirical findings matter for 
regulators and lawmakers. But discoveries about the world also matter 
as discoveries. They change the way scholars think about the subject, 
with whatever downstream effects that may have on research or 
reform. The next and final Section turns to theoretical implications of 
the widespread occurrence of insider giving.  
B. Theory of the Shareholder 
CEOs often grant one-on-one meetings with prominent investors, 
particularly those who indicate displeasure with the company’s 
apparent prospects. Should CEOs seek to calm those activist investors 
with a peek at reassuring, but nonpublic, information? There is good 
reason to think that they do. Indeed, they often contractually commit 
to doing so: one recent study found that more than 29 percent of the 
time shareholder engagement results in a contract,278 that contract 
promises special information access.279 These are extensive information 
rights far in excess of the information available to ordinary 
shareholders. Likewise, venture capitalists demand such covenants 
when they invest in early-stage companies.280 
Even without explicit information sharing, investors can secure 
implicit ongoing access to information if they place a director on the 
board. When shareholder engagement leads to a corporation–
shareholder agreement, more than a third of such contracts promise a 
 
 278.  Jordan Schoenfeld, Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders, 58 J. ACCT. RSCH. 383, 
414 (2020). The author likewise finds that such contracts arise in 24 percent of shareholder 
engagement. Id. at 385. 
 279.  Id. at 410. 
 280.  Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of Contract in 
Corporate Governance 22 (June 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3637204 [https://perma.cc/4QTV-7272] (reporting that 55 percent of new IPOs are 
subject to a shareholder agreement or were subject to one just prior to the IPO); id. at 32 
(reporting that information rights are common). 
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board representative to the shareholder.281 And the venture capitalist 
agreements that operate in the few years after an IPO almost always 
award one or more director seats to identifiable investor 
constituencies.282 As directors, these individuals have nearly unfettered 
access to the corporation’s information.283 The avowed purpose of 
placing these directors on the board is to supply the nominating 
investor with ongoing and intimate knowledge of the business’s 
prospects.284 These constituency nominees are often employees of the 
nominating shareholder285 or receive other compensation from the 
nominating shareholder.286 Many directors likewise recognize strong 
obligations to a particular shareholder when they serve on the board of 
a company with a controlling shareholder; at such a company, every 
shareholder serves at the pleasure of the controlling shareholder. 
 
 281.  Schoenfeld, supra note 278, at 410; accord Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on 
Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 213 n.191 (2012) (“Investors in venture capital–backed 
companies sometimes receive board ‘observation rights,’ which give them the ability to sit in on 
board meetings and thereby get information about the company’s direction. Observation rights 
may exclude the observer from full participation in the board meeting, such as during the 
executive sessions.”). 
 282.  See Rauterberg, supra note 280, at 47 (reporting 85 percent of sampled shareholder 
agreements explicitly or implicitly allocate directorates); accord Steven N. Kaplan & Per 
Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–90 (2003) (investigating a sample of 119 
startups, finding venture capitalist investors get a seat on the board of directors in almost half of 
startups and board control in about 25 percent). 
 283.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2020) (“Any director shall have the right to 
examine the corporation’s . . . books and records for a purpose reasonably related to the director’s 
position as a director.”); Chammas v. NavLink, Inc., No. CV 11265-VCN, 2016 WL 767714, at *6 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2016) (“A director who has a proper purpose, however, has ‘virtually unfettered’ 
rights to inspect books and records. Such ‘unfettered’ rights imply a right of access at least equal 
to that of the remainder of the board. Management cannot ‘pick and choose’ the specific 
information each director receives.” (quoting Norman v. US MobilComm, Inc., No. CIV.A. 849-
N, 2006 WL 1229115, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2006))). 
 284.  Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 863, 873 
(2020). 
 285.  See generally, e.g., id. (examining the shareholder-collaboration that occurs when hedge 
funds and venture capitalists place their employees on the target firm’s board); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency 
Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381 
(2019) (studying the information leakage that follows a hedge fund’s nomination of one of its 
employees to a firm’s board). 
 286.  Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. 
REV. 1246, 1268–71 (2017); Adam Prestidge, Activist Compensation of Board Nominees and the 
Middle Ground Response, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 307, 309–10 (2015) (describing compensation 
for activist nominees and undertaking policy analysis).  
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Needless to say, when a director is placed on the board at the request 
of an identifiable shareholder patron with a mandate to deliver 
information, these shareholders may receive information not available 
to others—there is suggestive evidence that this occurs.287  
It is understandable why these investors would want access: with 
a microscope on the corporation, they can make sure executives are 
making value-creating decisions without extracting too many perks. By 
coordinating with their on-board directors, expert shareholders can 
add value as monitors.288 Others have argued that cash-strapped firms 
may best obtain financing by providing superior terms to investors 
willing to risk money on them, and that board seats and information 
rights may be part of that bargain.289 It is also understandable why 
corporate law might want to constrain unequal access: it can help the 
well-informed shareholder at the expense of the corporation and its 
other investors.290 Now that this Article has shown that investors likely 
use their superior access to engage in manipulative transactions, those 
arguments can be revisited with greater precision. The private benefits 
associated with a controlling shareholder exist much further down the 
corporate food chain than control—any investor powerful enough to 
demand access can use that access to claim superior transaction results 
in the form of gifts.  
In light of the evidence about how investors utilize their access, 
corporate law theory must revise its implicit assumptions about the 
private benefits of control: these benefits may result from a much lower 
percentage of ownership than commonly expected. It tends to support 
recent cases, like In re Tesla Motors,291 which held that a 22 percent 
 
 287.  Coffee et al., supra note 285, at 408–28. 
 288.  Kastiel & Nili, supra note 102, at 46–47 (“If a constituent director is unable to share 
information with the fund that places her on the board, that director will not be able to utilize the 
fund’s vast sources to process and analyze data received from the board or enhance the 
monitoring of the management team.”). 
 289.  Sepe, supra note 29, at 312, 315, 337–38; Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift 
Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 
1105; cf. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1115 (2017) 
(“One can further assume—plausibly, in the context of at least some early-stage companies—that 
corporate opportunities are one of the most valuable forms of compensation a corporation has to 
offer.”). 
 290.  Gilson & Gordon, supra note 27, at 785.  
 291.  In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 12711-VCS, 2020 WL 553902 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 4, 2020). 
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owner could warrant the skeptical treatment owed to a controlling 
shareholder.292 If control includes the ability to extract and use inside 
information, the percentage held in ownership may be a great deal 
lower than that. 
Likewise, a debate rages about the proper evaluation of activist 
hedge funds. Are they forces of market discipline or opportunists (or 
both)? A recent study shows that information leakage increases when 
activists take a board seat.293 This Article supports the notion that 
activists obtain benefits from their role that may not help shareholders 
as a whole.  
Insider giving also teaches that these benefits can express 
themselves in subtle ways not ordinarily discussed in the literature. 
Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon identify three ways for 
controllers to profit from control: transacting with the entity on 
advantageous terms, selling control to someone else, or freezing out 
the minority.294 Insider giving is plainly none of those.  
To be sure, this Article is only talking about gifts. If gift-giving is 
the only private benefit large shareholders extract, it may not inspire a 
fundamental rethinking of shareholder power. Yet it is precisely 
because these are only gifts that they have so much to teach. These gifts 
occupy a liminal space, unlikely to result in detection and punishment, 
but still arguably illegal and injurious. They provide a potent insight 
into the behavior and power of shareholders. Thinking that they act 
without observers or enforcers, large shareholders show what they are 
capable of. They have enough access to extract market-moving 
information and use it for transactions. Presumably, they use this 
access in other ways that are not yet subject to detection and analysis. 
Scholars interested in shareholder power must take note.  
Finally, our empirical findings bring up a related finance question. 
Does gifting by a large shareholder provide useful information to 
ordinary investors regarding overpricing in the stock market? The 
answer seems like a definite yes. Abnormal stock price declines should 
be used by sophisticated investors in managing their portfolios. 
Someone who knows when shareholders make gifts could outperform 
the market by selling at the same time.  
Nevertheless, there are important practical limits on this 
investment strategy. The key is reporting delays. This is because gifts 
 
 292.  Id. at *4–5. 
 293.  Coffee et al., supra note 285, at 408–28. 
 294.  Gilson & Gordon, supra note 27, at 786.  
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do not need to be reported right away, and most are reported with 
substantial delays. In many cases, by the time gifts are reported, prices 
have already declined. But a trader who learned promptly about 
insider gifts could profitably outperform the market.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article investigates the information content of charitable 
gifts by large shareholders using a comprehensive database that 
contains over 9,000 observations between 1986 and 2020. These 
findings apply generally to all large shareholders’ gifts of their firm’s 
stock in all publicly listed firms in the United States. 
We find that large shareholders’ charitable gifts are suspiciously 
well timed. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6 percent during the 
one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 
4 percent during the one-year period after the gift date. The evidence 
suggests these results are neither due to luck nor skill in analyzing 
information. To the contrary, this research indicates that large 
shareholders’ success is likely due mostly to leakage of material 
nonpublic information from the top executives and to a lesser extent 
from the backdating of their gifts. 
The prevalence of manipulative gifts is understandable. Relative 
to lawful gifts, they deliver much more potent benefits. When trouble 
looms for a company, manipulative gifts of its stock can deliver tax 
benefits approximating or exceeding the profits from lawful sales. The 
donor may be feted as an elite and enlightened benefactor, but the 
gift’s true cost is paid by other taxpayers and whoever was unlucky 
enough to buy the doomed shares from the charity. Gifts are also much 
safer than outright insider trading. Prosecutors may be reluctant to 
challenge manipulative gifts because some of the best tools for 
combating insider trading may not apply to gifts, and there is no 
functional reporting regime to promptly detect and scrutinize gifts. 
Given the excellent combination of safety and profitability, it 
should be unsurprising that gifts are widely utilized by large 
shareholders. Indeed, scholars have long noted that controlling 
shareholders, venture capitalists, and activist hedge funds expect access 
to management. In retrospect, it is obvious that information flows will 
be used opportunistically where the legal risk is low, as it currently is 
for gifts. 
Yet there is no such thing as a free lunch, and the gifts 
shareholders give have a social cost. A society that opposes valuation 
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abuse under the tax code or insider trading under securities laws should 
be concerned by manipulative gifts. This Article advocates for 
removing the free pass currently afforded to even the most suspicious 
gifts and for continued inquiry into the topic.  
Gifts by large shareholders also give a window into the concealed 
role powerful investors play in corporations. Our findings indicate that 
large investors have and exercise a much wider degree of access than 
commonly understood. This fact should operate as a premise in any 
subsequent empirical and theoretical projects examining shareholder 
behavior and power, including those that do not focus on gifts. It 
rehearses an insight developed by anthropologists,295 sociologists,296 
and philosophers about the nature of gifts.297 Gifts may appear to be 
disinterested and radically separate from the logic of exchange. Yet 
gifts substitute for other transactions, and giving is continuous with 
other forms of commerce and economic life.  
 
 
 295. E.g., C.A. Gregory, Gifts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 524, 
524 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (“Anthro-pologists stress that while gifts appear to be 
voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, they are in fact obligatory and interested.”).  
 296.  See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 
496–99 (2005); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN 
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 3 (W. D. Halls. trans., W. W. Norton 1990) (1950) (“In Scandinavian 
civilization, and in a good number of others, exchanges and contracts take place in the form of 
presents . . . .”). 
 297.  See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora’s Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 815 (1999) (analyzing political philosophy of gifts to conclude gifts are used by 
the donors to impose obligations on donees).  
